An Reabhloid: Vol. 1 no. 2, Autumn 1986

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[THE REVOLUTION]

VOLUME 1. NUMBER 2

e | 1986. OUTSIDE IRELAND 80p.

AUTUMN 1986.

"PRICE 60p_

JOURNAL OF PEOPLES DEMOCRACY

AN REABHLOID

AN REABHLOID|The revolution] is the political journal of Proples Democracy. Normally unsigned articles will indicate a formal statement of the views of the organisation. Signed articles do not necessarily reflect the views of Peoples Democracy. We welcome submissions on the issues raised in the journal from outside our organisation.

CONTENTS

TWISTS AND TURNS OF BRITISH STRATEGY

JOHN MAGEE

| LESSONS FROM THE DIVORCE DEFEAT

_ ANN CONWAY

THE CRISIS OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

KEVIN McCRACKEN

TAXATION AND THE NATIONAL DEBT

PAT CORCORAN

_ LETTER; PRISONERS SPEAK OUT!

_ REVIEWS;

| LOOKING BACK ON THE HUNGER STRIKE

| JAMES MACKIN

REPUBLICANS ANALYSE DEAL

JOHN NORTH

IRELAND’S PERMANENT REVOLUTION

JOE CARTER

SOUTH AFRICA

Explaining the problems which face both imperialism and .

irish capitalism, this article cuts through the hype surrounding the Anglo-Irish Agreement and explains its real nature. It also examines the crisis of perspectives now afflicting loyalism and a parallel lack of strategy facing the Republican movement. It argues that only a new political campaign by anti-imperialists can chart the road to freedom.

The article is the basis of a document to be presented to Peoples Democracy’s national leadership. , The defeat of the divorce campaign illustrates once again the power of the catholic church and the inability of bourgeois and reformist parties to tackle it. Far from confirming the appropriatness of partition the result reinforces the need to smash it. While criticising the weak role of republicanism and arguing that women must rely on themselves, it demonstrates that an alliance of women, workers and the anti-imperialist movement is vital to this and every progrssive struggle. This article explains the failure of the trade union movement to tackle sectarianism in the North and the austerity offensive in the South. Explaining the pro-imperialist nature of the trade union leadership, it argues that only when the unions break from this leadership will they be capable of asserting the rights of working people.

This article, taken from a union journal, is written by a PD member and taskes up the question of the National debt and how the workers movement should face up to it.

Starting a debate about questions of strategy is a prime aim of ‘An Reabhioid’ and we are pleased to print a letter recieved from two republican P.O.W’s which provides a stimulating .

and critical analysis of the Hillsborough deal and how the national liberation movement is facing up to it.

Tom Collin’s is the only book to date on the hunger strike and for this reason has recieved some attention. This review, written by an activist in the H-Block campaign, previously appeared in a shorter version in the Belfast paper ‘Andersonstown News’. All the reviews concentrate on examining the lessons of recent events in the country. Danny Morrison traces the development of the Anglo-Irish deal and provides the only extended analysis of it so far.

As ajournal of marxism it is important to develop a debate in the marxist left on revolutionary strategy in Ireland. This review takes up the ideas of the Socialist Workers movement aas presented in a recent booklet.

An Reabhloid continues its debate on South Africa by reprinting some extracts from the resolution recently adopted by the Fourth International.

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EDITORIAL

Seventy-two years ago, at the first indication that partition was a real option for British imperialism and their Irish vollaborators, Connolly wrote that ‘Such a scheme ... would mean a carnival of reaction both North and South.” ‘It would, make division more’ intense and confusion of ideas and parties more confounded.” Today as never before the confusion Connolly — brilliantly predicted is evident.

in the North opposition to the Anglo - Irish Agreement; an agreement which is a ‘bulwark against a United Ireland‘ is led by lovalists who have most to benefit from it. Those who should be seen to lead a political campaign against it, the republican movement, have been pushed to the sidelines in this struggle. Instead of a political campaign offering an alternative they have embarked on a military policy of threatening those who service British and RUC barracks.

This policy is seen as shifting the target away from the British themselves and widening unacceptably the category of legitimate targets. It allows the British and Free State establishments to paint the IRA as the same as the sectarian terrorists of the UFF and UVF.

The size of the August internment commemoration in Belfast shows that the nationalist workers who support the fight against British imperialism do not and will not accept this lie.

But the real question to be asked is not will this lose support for the struggle but will it increase it? Will it play any role in turning the minority that actively supports the struggle into the majority needed to make it successful? Instead of isojating the British and RUC we think it has facilitated Britain's attempt to isolate republicans, one of the principle aims of the Hillsborough deal. In terms of Connolly's it does nothing to lessen ‘the confusion of ideas and parties’.

The issues this second An Reabhloid takes up shows this confusion continues to be a major obstacle in the way of the unity of all the oppressed in the country. For example in the divorce referendum the champions of that democratic right were seen to be those reactionary forces opposed to national democracy - Fine Gael, Labour and the Workers Party. In the trade union movement the Irish Congress of Trade Unions claims to leadership are based, they say, on their defence of working class interests - but they too oppose the present struggle against imperialism and waste no opportunity to condemn the republican leadership. Both articles dealing with these issues emphasise strongly the need for the antiimperialist movement to intervene and win the leadership of the workers and womens movements to the struggle for national liberation and socialism.

As we declared in our first editorial, our aim of developing a revolutionary strategy and programme cannot be done by ourselves alone but only by debate in the anti-imperialist and workers movements. We are therefore especially pleased to have recieved the views of some republican POW’s on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. We will continue to provide a forum for debate and invite other prisoners to continue the discussion. This is an invitation we extend to all our readers.

kKakk kk kk kK Since the publication of our first issue we have attempted to start this debate by holding a number of public meetings in Dublin and Belfast involving Sinn Fein and_ other other organisations. To continue to develop our own analysis we have held a highly successful summer school in Wexford at the end of August involving members and supporters. We are also holding a number of open educationals in Belfast which are adverised elsewhere in the journal and readers interested in similiar meetings in other areas of the country should contact the addresses of our branches.

page |

TWISTS AND TURNS OF

BRITISH STRATEGY

The Hillsborough Agreement signed in November 1985 continues to provoke widespread confusion over British policy in Ireland. Loyalist unanimity in viewing the Agreement as ‘the slippery slope to a United Ireland’ has been strengthencd with each meeting of the intergovernmental conference; while amongst Nationalists the failure of even minor reforms to materialise bolsters fears that yet again their needs and aspirations are being trampled on

NO SOLUTION!

The Agreement was hailed as an ‘historic landmark’ by both London and Dublin at its inception. This hyping of the Agreement raised expectation that something wholly new vas going to happen in the North. In fact the tendency to invest every political initiative with historical grandeur has characterised British policy all along. What it covers over is the plain fact that Britain has no cut and dried.

solution. For most of this century the rule of British imperialism in Ireland has rested on the partition of the country into two separate statelets - both of which have inexorably been sectarian in character. All attempts to democratise these statelets have floundered, generally defeated through’ legislative and/or physical repression. This is true even of sovernment sponsered reform, underscoring the realities behind a Protestant state in the North, a Catholic state in the South. Imperialist attempts to restore political stabliity in Jreland are entrapped and disintgegrated in the web of its own strategic instrument for the subjugation of Ireland.

partition

NO REFORMS

The prolonged decline of British imperialism since World War Two has long demanded modifications in Britain’s relations with Ireland and consequently in Britain’s political strategy for securing its interest in Ireland. A more sophisticated political framework than the sectarianism of partition became necessary. Instead of fostering artificial divisions it became necessary to maximise unity and integration. There was never any possibility of abruptly bringing about such a change. A long-term strategy of rationalising Ireland’s political structures and enveloping the whole country more tightly within Britain’s orbit was projected.

In the second part of the 1960's this strategy became entangled with a genuine democratic upsurge amongst the Nationalist masses in the North. The agitation to extend elementary civil rights to the Catholic population unmasked the vicious sectarianism of the Stormont statelet. This unbalanced the system of imperialist control and initiated the crisis that continues today. In the process the struggle for civil rights within the framework of partition has been transformed into a struggle against partition itself - a war of national liberation. This revolutionary dynamic was fully confirmed with the proroguing of the Stormont parliament in 1972; following on a period of generalised mass struggle provoked by internment inAugust 1971 and Derry’s Bloody Sunday in January 1972. Since 1972 every attempt by Britain to find a substitute for Stormont has failed miserably. The challenge of the republican resistance blocked any retreat to reliance on the traditional alliance with loyalism while loyalist intransigence spiked the development of new political structures reflecting the strategic importance of ‘constitutional nationalism’.

THE HUNGER STRIKE

Between its Assemblies and Conventions British policy had concious or coherent strategy on the part of the offensive against the national liberation movement.

‘Ulsterisation’ and Criminalisation’ were complementary strands of this offensive designed to obscure Britain’s imperial role in Ireland and isolate the republican resistance both within Ireland and internationally.

Then came the hunger strike. The latter did not reflect any concious or coherent strategy on the. part of the republican resistance. It arose out of the determination of the republican political prisoners to defeat British attempts to portray and treat them a's ‘gangsters’ rather than prisoners of war. The heroic struggle of the prisoners stirred tens of thousands throughout Ireland and__ internationally, mobilisations not witnessed since the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in 1972. The first of the hunger strikers - Bobby Sands - was elected to the Westminster parliament for the Fermanagh - South Tyrone constituency while another, Kieran Doherty, was elected to the parliament of the 26 counties, Dail Eirann. Some 100,000 people marched in the funeral of Bobby Sands in a massive display of the anger of nationalist working people.

‘The intransigence of the British government blocked a victory for the hunger strikers and the republican prisoners in Long Kesh and Armagh. But the British victory over the prisoners was purchased at the price of bringing to the surface mass resentment against British rule and influence most notably in the 6 counties but also in the formally independent 26 counties. The effects of partition and the unresolved national question were now centre-stage.

THE SINN FEIN CHALLENGE

Barely a year after the hunger strike was ended Sinn Fein recieved 10% of the vote in elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly. In 1983 Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote and ousted the renegade nationalist Gerry Fitt from his West Belfast constituency. Two years later 59 Sinn Fein candidates were elected in the “North’s local government elections. While in the 26 counties the republican vote declined in the post - hunger strike period, the results were modest rather than insignificant.

The electoral interventions however had an importance beyond the number of votes achieved. The hunger strike’ campaign reawakened and remobilised people around the national question in a period when a developing crisis of political instability in the 26 counties is converging with the chronic instability of the past 20 years within the North.

Sinn Fein came out of the campaign a real political force with a new radical leadership seeking to do more than bang the big drum for the IRA. This leadership wanted to make

republicanism relevant ‘to much wider social, economic and political questions than the armed struggle; it wanted to transform Sinn Fein into a vibrant political party and it was prepared to question traditiional principles such as the ‘Holy writ’ of abstentionism. An abstentionist, irredentist Sinn Fein could be very troublesome, a major irritant, but would remain a peripheral force in Irish society; a radical republican party prepared to challenge the bourgeois parties and state in their own institutions would be much more serious, might possibly even with a limited electoral impact secure the balance of power and force a polarisation in Irish society not witnessed since partition. No wonder bourgeois politicians in the 26 counties froth at the mouth at the hint of SinnFein deputies in Dail Eireann.

BRITAIN’S MISASSESSMENT

British imperialism was quick to take advantage of the failure of the hunger strike to launch a new political initiative by aiming at co-opting a section of the Nationalist population into running the affairs of the 6 counties. ‘Prior’s Assembly’ as it was dubbed rested on a mistaken assessment of the effects of the hunger strike on the Irish people and in particular the nationalist minority in the North.

Thatcher’s intransigence outlasted the determination of prisoners but provoked massive resentment throughout Ireland which became deep-rooted in the 6 counties. This not only represented itesif in spiralling electoral success for Sinn Fein but also in blocking any possible move by the SDLP to take seats in the Assembly. Any moves towards devolving power to the Assembly would have strengthened loyalist demands and further weakened the SDLP.

The SDLP and the Southern establishment did not make this mis-assessment of the impact of the hunger strike. Closer to the ground they could’nt afford to show any contempt for the increased anti-British sentiment and the growing conviction that the Northern struggle would embroil the South.

BOURGEOIS POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

The British and the middle class nationalist parties had and have a common objective - to isolate.and destroy the republican resistance. In the midst of the hunger strike Charles Haughey, leader of Fianna Fail, ‘The Republican Party’ had initiated the ‘Anglo-Irish Talks’; this ‘tea-pot diplomacy’ as it was then ridiculed, offered increased security collaboration in return for concessions from Britain to lessen ‘nationalist alienation’. The collaboration was delivered, the concessons not.

The advent of the Coalition government of Garret Fitzgerald initiated a propaganda operation involving the Southern political parties, the SDLP and the Catholic church stressing the ‘alienation’ felt by Northern catholics, the ‘concern’ of the Dublin government for ‘nationalist interests’ and at the same time ‘outlawing’ Sinn Fein both politically and ‘morally’. Dublin also launched a political initiative ‘the Forum for a new Ireland’ to which all loyalist parties were invited but from which Sinn Fein was specifically excluded on the spurious grounds that it ‘supported violence’.

IMPERIALISM BARKS! - DUBLIN JUMPS!

‘Thatcher’s conrmptuous ‘Out, Out, Out!’ rejection of the forums three options in 1984 seemed a devastating blow to the parties of so-called ‘constitutional nationalism’. In fact ‘constitutional nationalism’ was put in its place and reminded who was boss. Those who believe that the British had a ‘change of heart’ which led to the Anglo-Irish agreement are quite simply wrong. What was ‘out’ in November 1984 is still‘Out!’ today!

What actually happened was that ‘constitutional nationalism’ emasculated its demands. This is patently clear when one examines the aspect of the Agreement hailed as ‘historic’ - the consultative role given to the Dublin government. Eight months on from Hillsborough not one concession has resulted from the exercise of this consultative role. Yet there have been many meetings of both the inter-governmental conference and the Secretariat. There have even been agreements, such asthe British pledge in response to Dublin representations, that Orange marches would not be permitted through nationalist areas. Britain will consult, Britain will promise and Britain will then do what it wants.

While Dublin and the SDLP protest, they cannot afford to protest too loudly. The pretence of ‘concessions’ must be maintained. Take the Flags and Emblems Act as an

example. It is often stated that the Tricolour is an ‘illegal flag’ in the 6 counties under this act and that the repeal of this act is a significant reform. This fiction is maintained and promoted by ‘constitutional nationalism’ to bolster the illusion of reform. In fact the Tricolour or any other flag is perfectly legal in the North. The Flags and Emblems Act simply gives a special status to the ‘Union Flag’ and empowers the RUC to prohibit the tricolour where its display might lead to ‘abreach of the peace’. Repeal or no, we can expect that the RUC will continue to’ implement this policy.

A DANGEROUS CONFUSION

Imperialism desires an end to the conflict in the North which has continued now for 17 years. Chronic, ongoing instability makes Ireland, North and South, a less attractive place for lucrative profits for multinational investment ana a neavy economic drain on both Britain and the 26 counties.

But imperialism seeks an end on its own terms.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement expressed British terms. It may “not be ‘historic? but it does represent the most serious and significant initiative since Sunningdale and from the anti-imperialist perspective the most dangerous.

Much of the confusion surrounding the deal springs from seeing it as a deal between two equal partners which it is not! When Peter Barry ‘agrees to differ’ with Tom King, in reality he buckles under British dictate.

When Tom King describes the Agreement as a ‘bulwark against a United Ireland’ - this is the assessment which counts. It is true that both imperialism and its native capitalist allies are increasingly desperate for a solution in the North.

But imperialism retains a wider range of options than either ‘constitutional nationalism’ or loyalism. We can be certain that whatever the future of the Agreement, ‘constitutional nationalism’ whether the Hume, Fitzgerald or Haughey variety will cling to it to the bitter end.

THE CRISIS OF LOYALISM

The Orange monolith that guaranteed one-party Stormont .Government for SQ years was cemented by sectarian page 3 privilege. Any challenge to this privilege immediately threatens the monolith and consequently the supremacy of loyalism itself. This explains the virulent response by loyalism to any tampering with this privilege - the 1969 pogroms, the 1974 and 1977 strikes, and now their increasingly violent protest against the Hillsborough Agreement. The mass resistance struggle of the anti-unionists 1969 -72 struck major blows against Orange Supremacy with the disarming of the RUC, the disbandment of the B Specials, the exclusion of RUC from anti-unionist areas and culminated in the fall of Stormontitself.

To a certain extent British imperialism was able to limit the dynamic of the fall of Stormont - the dismantling of the Orange statelet - and use it to better defend partition.

Stormont, around which both anti-unionists and loyalists had focused the conflict, was gone.

The republican resistance had neither the political maturity or the physical capability to provide a line of advance which could generalise opposition to imperialism on a 32 county level. The unionist monolith which cracked under the pressure of’ the civil rights struggle now began to show deep fissures a process exacerbated by the shrinking of the traditional Orange capitalist class. Three strands have formed in unionism over the past two decades; those prepared to do a deal within the framework of the Northern statelet which would permit a measure of ‘democratisation’ (Alliance Party, a section of the OUP); those who see no long-term security other than through full integration with Britain (some in the OUP); those who remain committed to Orange supremacy (rest of the OUP, the DUP, the loyalist terror gangs) At moments of deep crisis these strands have found an uneasy unity, but only temporarily. The ‘moderates’ have no real or substantial interests apart from those of Britsh imperialism [many in the professional middle classes are directly paid by the British state]. The ‘extremists’ on the other hand see their interests entirely bound up with the system of graft, discrimination and privilege and are ; FREE. THE RISONe ee

FREE THE PEOPLE

and SDLP didn’t. The British underestimated the hunger strike - the Free State |

Page 4 ——So trenchantly opposed to any tampering with this system. The The” political” ambivalence however distorts the armed recession has had a contradictory impact of both those wings: the former feel increasingly nervous about British strategy and the consequences of opposing it while the latter’s sectarianism and ferocity is reinforced. : This contradiction is expressed in the retreat of the OUP (symbolised by Molyneux’s pathetic self-imposed media silence) on the one hand and the occupations of Hillsborough, Swatragh, Clontibret and the heightened activity of loyalist terror gangs. While it would be extremely naive to understate the dangerousness of the ‘extremists’, the reality is that while they can sustain a terror campaign against the nationalist population for some time, without loyalist unity their political demands cannot be won. Undoubtedly part of Britain’s gamble was that all-out opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement would assume a UDI dynamic and that this would be unacceptable to the majority of loyalists.

Our analysis so far has emphasised the disparateness of British strategy, constitutional nationalism and Joyalism. In” immediate terms this desperation flows from the rise of the H-Block movement and the consequent electoral prominence of Sinn Fein. Both London and Dublin governmental spokespersons have articulated the key aim of the Hillsborough Agreement as the isolation of Sinn Fein and the defeat of the IRA. Despite this, republican analysis of the Agreement has been ambivalent and the response halting and confused. The Agreement has been at one and the same time denounced as ‘the copperfastening of partition’, and described as embodying ‘concessions’ sewcured by the armed struggle of the IRA Underlying this ambiguity there appears to be an impressionistic and rather naive assessment that the Agreement does not represent a ‘direct’ attack on republicans. The confrontation between Britain and the loyalists, the problems within the loyalist camp are put at the centre of analysis. Thus the proposed electoral pact with the SDLP where Sinn Fein offered to set aside ‘party differences’ (opposition to the Agreement?) in order to deprive loyalists of seats in the ’ Westminister Parliament!

It may be suggested that this proposed electoral pact was designed to expose the SDLP’s refusal to seek anti-unionist unity. Unfortunately it was Sinn Fein’s political immaturity that was exposed. The SDLP was founded, and its whole history has confirmed that it is a party of accommodation with loyalism and more fundamentally accommodation with imperialism. In the bye-elections following the Agreement (an Agreement of which the SDLP were happy to be seen as architects) the way to counter the SDLP was through explaining the treachery of the Agreement around a platform unequivocally for British withdrawal and Irish unity.

This was of course difficult if not impossible for a party that viewed the Agreement as offering concessions. It also pointed up Sinn Fein’s expectation that if the Agreement does not deliver significant reform of partition, constitutional nationalism will autornatically be exposed. In reality it is only through the contrast of the crumbs of constitutional nationalism with principled consistent anti-imperialist demands that support will be broken away from parties like the SDLP.

If this presentation of republican analysis seems overly polemical then in mitigation the question must be posed: ‘What political alternative does Sinn Fein counterpose to the Agreement?’ The only answer possible is that no alternative has been presented!

DISTORTED ARMED STRUGGLE

Not surprisingly this vacuum is being filled by the armed struggle. It is here that the republican response to the Agreement is being delivered - no truck with collaboration.

struggle. The campaign against those who one pundit has coined ‘the tea and buns merchants’ evokes hysteria and distracts from the indiscriminate nature of loyalist terror; it allows the Brits and RUC to slide into the pose of ‘protectors’.

The generalisation of this campaign to all those whose work brings them into contact with the RUC is unsustainable and aggravates the isolation of the anti-imperialist movement in Ireland as a whole.

FREEDOM CHARTER

The key tasks of anti-imperialists in both the political and armed organisations are:- 1. To explain the real nature of the Agreement 2. To expose the shallowness of the promised ‘reforms’.

3. To prepare defence of nationalist areas against loyalist terror gangs and state forces through the democratic mobilisation of the working people.

4, To present a political alternative charting the road to a united, free and independent country.

The proposal for a FREEDOM CHARTER made by PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY could serve to focus a campaign around these tasks. It would underline that British rule continues to rest on military occupation and can only be maintained by repression, both in the North and increasingly also in the 26 Counties. The illusion that Fianna Fail and the SDLP can negotiate freedom from imperialist domination is what leads to and sustains collaboration. ; Such a campaign could provide a forum for the nationalist working people to declare their solidarity with all other oppressed sections of Irish society. At the 1985 Ard Fheis of Sinn Fein Gerry Adams spoke of the national movement as something much broader than the constituent parts of the Republican Movement. If this was a recognition that the Republican Movement had to develop alliances with all those ' who share the objective interest of smashing imperialist rule it may herald a coming to grips with one of the Movement’s main weaknesses, precisely that of building and maintaining alliances with other anti-imperialists, trade unionists, women and youth. Up to now, while the Movement through Sinn.

Fein has made major strides on social and economic policy, it has not been able to effectively work with people outside its ranks. It is almost as if the Movement has no confidence that in a broad open movement of the oppressed it would be able to win support for its policies. This seems to apply not just to bureaucratic structures like the trade unions but even the loose campaign structures of the women’s movement.

The trajectory of the Republican Movement since the last Ard ‘Fheis has unfortunately failed to clarify the promise of Gerry Adams’ Presidential Address. Rather than Sinn Fein using its new found political and electoral strength to promote the necessary mobilisations against imperialist attacks it is displaying a remarkable inability to give leadership to those layers who have placed confidence in the Republican Movement.

JOHN MAGEE

page 5

LESSONS FROM THE

DIVORCE DEFEAT

When Archbishop McNamara compared the possible introduction of divorce to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster he let everyone know what the Catholic church regarded as the stakes in the divorce referendum. For many women it was scarcely an exaggeration. For all women it is a big setback and one also for the struggle for a united Ireland for the struggle for a united Ireland and the struggle of the working class against austerity. The result of the referendum (63% to 37% against the introduction of divorce) shows above all the complete incapacity of bourgois forces in Ireland to deliver basic democratic rights to Irish women. It demonstrated in particular their incapacity to stand up to the church.

Was the result inevitable, or could the limited measures proposed in the referendum have been won under a different campaign leadership? This article argues that not only could the vote have been won but that a major ideological and political victory could have been scored against the Catholic church and right wing reactionary forces in Ireland.

In the media and in political circles the result has been widely proclaimed as a massive defeat. It is certainly a major gain for the right and gives them the green light to go on a full scale attack against women and other oppressed groups.

But the result also shows that there is a substantial minority -in Ireland who refuse to accept Catholic church diktats and if organised could have a big impact in challenging the right wing offensive. The anger and alienation felt by many who voted ‘Yes’ must be given afocus and used constructively otherwise it will turn into real demoralisation and despair.

THE CAMPAIGN

The Government announced its intention in early May to hold a referendum to remove the constitutional ban on divorce before the Dail recess in late June. Throughout the campaign Fine Gael did almost nothing to get the referendum passed unwilling to risk a confrontation in their own ranks and amongst their traditional supporters in rural areas. But they could hardly have believed that a short campaign would mean the anti-divorce forces following their example and doing nothing. It appears that the decision to hold the referendum like this had more to do with narrow political selfinterest than in dealing with the problem of marital breakdown.A victory in the referendum, which the opinion polls predicted, would have increased the Government’s popularity , in the run-up to the next general election and would have promoted Garrett's ‘constitutional crusade’.

The other Coalition party, the Labour party, was only slightly less opportunistic. They did canvass in some areas; in those where they had lost electoral support and in particular in the Dublin region. However in Dick Spring’s constituency in Kerry they failed to mount any campaign at all.

It was left mainly to the Divorce Action Group (DAG), the group fighting for divorce rights, to mobilise support and win the vote. DAG had been in existence for several years and it was in a good position to lead a national campaign. Numerous opinion polls had shown approximately 60 - 70% of the electorate in favour of divorce yet DAG failed to turn this support into votes. It has explained this failure as due to the vicious campaign of distortion and fear ran by the Anti-Divorce campaign and to their own lack of organisation. In fact the success of the anti-divorce canpaign and the failure of DAG are symptoms of.

the underlying political weakness of the pro-divorce campaign. DAG refused to address itself to the forces who could have won the campaign - the working class in general and women and youth in particular. The anti- divorce campaign did, by playing on the fears of thousands of women that they would have no means of financial support if divorced by their husbands (ignoring the as many as 70,000 women already deserted). It appealed to youth by ridiculing a referendum on divorce when what was really needed was work. A reactionary and unpopular Government dedicated to cutting welfare and jobs was relied upon to rebut these arguements! The launching rally of the campaign in liberty hall gave a good indication of the politics of the people heading up DAG and the shape the pro-divorce campaign would take. The platform consisted of speakers from all the Leinster House parties. Missing from the platform were speakers from the women’s, workers and anti-imperialist movements. The Labour party speakers welcomed the restrictive nature of the proposed amendment and emphasised that Labour would only support restrictive divorce legislation. This theme was supported by Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats.

Throughout the campaign they argued that divorce legislation must be restrictive to protect the family. The Divorce Action group unfortunately accepted this argument right from the start.

THE ARGUMENT

The whole debate on the family was handed over to the rightwing sectarian forces in the Anti-Divorce campaign. The pro-divorce lobby never challenged the idealised view of the family put forward by the right. The notion of the family as a loving caring unit is very far from reality for many Irish families. The increase in the separation rate and marital breakdown and the growth in the number of women facing violence in the home are all evidence of the serious crisis which the family is going through. This crisis is also reflected in the number of battered children and the increase in the number of children born to single women. The most recent evidence showing the reality as opposed to the myth of the Irish family was provided by the most recent issue of ‘Magill’ magazine which caried a report showing that in 1 in 4 families there is child sexual abuse. The idea of the family as a relationship which institutionalises womens oppression was completely absent from the campaign.

DAG didn’t argue for divorce as a civil right - its propaganda was a mirror image of Labour and Fine Gael’s. They argued for divorce on compassionate grounds which had the effect of making women appear as victims and separated people as failures. Divorce as a civil right respecting the independence

page 6 and freedom of the individual was hardly referred to.

Demanding the right for women and men to take control over their lives would surely have encouraged more to vote yes.

Projecting separated people as unfortunates and failures needing compassion had the effect of strengthening the antidivorce campaign arguments - the hard-pressed taxpayer would be called on yet again to support these unfortunates.

THE CHURCH

But fundimentally the liberals in the pro-divorce lobby refused to challenge the Catholic church’s powerful intervention into the anti-divorce campaign. The insertion of the clause whereby marrages had to have failed for 5 years was a concessionary sop to the Bishops. The government hoped that such restrictions would prevent the church hierarchy from actively opposing the referendum. The government was only prepared to counter the church in the most cautious and cowardly way since Fine Gael and the capitalist class they represent depends on the church to maintain social control and order in society. The anti-divorce campaign supported by the church ran a vicious campaign every arguement was used to intimidate and frighten people.

The pulpits became political platforms and the few clergy who supported the referendum were silenced. The divorce campaign, like the 1984 anti-amendment campaign, shows the tremendious power which the church still holds in Ireland.

and it shows that this power will not gradually fade away. It will have to be consistently confronted and fought against something which the ‘two nationists’ of the Labour and Workers patties refuse to accept.

The notion put forward by the revisionists of the Workers party and their allies is that with the opening up of the Irish economy to multi-national capitalist industry and the subsequent development of a large working class Ireland had gradually since the 60’s become a modern bourgois democracy. This has been shown by the divorce referendum to be utter nonsense. Prionsais De Rossa of the Workers party, speaking at the DAG launching rally, welcomed the referendum claiming that our ability to hold the referendum showed the extent Pug AGH S4Q0 UAT, oe Leixlip: Christ versus civil rights to. which’ we were now truely a democracy like other European bourgois democracies. Yet Ireland in the only country in Europe where the church exerts such a tremendious influence. He made no effort to explain this.

The reality is that the power and influence of organised religion is a feature of all countries which have been dominated by imperialism. In Ireland the Catholic church’s specific power lies in its historic political association with the struggle of the Irish people to free themselves from centuries of British rule. But its power is also dependent upon imperialism and partition. The completely opportunistic and hypocritical assertion by the church of being on the side of the people has given it a central ideological and "political place in the life of the 26 counties. It has been ‘on the side of the people’ when it stood to gain some concessions for the church but when the establishment came under threat it then changed. This history has permitted it to dominated state policies for a long time and to have its social and moral teachings written into the Free State constitution.

THE 1937 CONSTITUTION

In some respects an analogy can be drawn with the events surrounding the 1937 constitution. Margaret Ward in her book ‘Unmanageable Revolutionaries’ pointed out that the result of the referendum held on enacting the constitution showed a lukewarm acceptance of it. In fact voting patterns.

in 1937 were similiar to the recent divorce results with approximately 35% voting against the constitution. She argued that if Cumann na Mban had mobilised its residual support the outcome could have been a decisive defeat for De Valera. The striking common feature of 1937 and today is that the same social forces are united in their opposition to democratic rights for women - the church, the catholic nationalists of Fianna Fail and -the traditionalist right of Fine Gael. The campaigns of the two periods experienced similiar obstacles for example in the schism between the Feminist and Republican movements was seen in the divorce campaign as it was in the 1937 anti-constitution campaign.

THE LEADERSHIP NEEDED

If we return to our original question, could the campaign have been won by a different leadership, we must ask where this alternative was. The proclaimed leadership of the working class, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, declared their support for the amendment and produced a leaflet for their members encouraging them to vote ‘Yes’. Donal Nevin however declared that they did not seek to ‘confront’ the Catholic church. Having surrendered to the opposition right away the movement refused in reality to mount an active campaign. The potential power of the union movement was not mobilised, the bureaucracy which leads it were afraid to do so. No such timidity affected Fianna Fail. While officially declaring a neutrality it in practice made no bones about its position. In a further retreat into Catholic nationalism it stood quite clearly for the maintenance and strengthening of Church-State relations. While Fine Gael has sought to protect the family and Free State capitalism through modernising legislation, basing itself on the liberal middle class, Fianna Fail as the states most sucessful party has understood that the best protection is in reinforcing the Catholic church and Catholic nationalism - the traditional social and ideological props of the Free State capitalist class.

Fianna Fail’s identification of republicanism with catholic nationalism made it more imperative that the Republican movement provided a loud and consistently secular republican voice to combat this. By and large however they failed. Their ‘Yes’ campaign was low key and localised with fo national impact. It asked those of its supporters who opposed divorce to at least not vote ‘No’. Instead it should have strongly declared that consistent republicanism demanded that they vote ‘Yes’. That the Republican movement’s approach failed is shown by the fact that in the border counties where it has significant support many of its supporters voted ‘No’. It missed a unique opportunity to” demonstrate to the Irish working class and especially to women that the struggle for a United Ireland is indivisible from the struggle for women’s rights and the rights of all the oppressed.

The movement clearly did not understand the importance of it identifying with this particular struggle for democratic rights, exposing the hypocrisy of the Coatition parties and the reactionary stance of the Fianna Fail ‘Republicans’. By identifying itself with all struggles for democratic rights it can begin to create a situation where in turn these struggles are identified with it. Until then it will not be in a position to rally all the oppressed behind its banner and will fail to make the alliances with the only forces that can achieve national freedom - the working class and the oppressed.

One initiative was taken by a number of anti-imperialist feminists involving members of Peoples Democracy.

Page 7 A public meeting was organised in order to bring into the campaign an anti-imperialist, feminist voice and to publically call for all republicans, socialists and feminists to actively mobilise for a ‘Yes’ vote.

Unfortunately this was only a small event which could only point the way for larger forces to follow. That they did not.

‘points up perhaps the most immediate and fundamental lesson to be learned from the referendum failure - that women car only rely on themselves. Just as Ireland must free itself and the working class can only be free through its own struggle so women can only guarantee their own liberation through their own activity.

THE FALLOUT

‘MOST MEDIA ATTENTION IN THE North and Britain has focussed on the damage that the ‘Noe’ vote has done to the Anglo-Irish agreement. The unionists led by Paisley have used the result to claim that fhe agreement 1s on tts last legs because it shows the South’s unwillingness to make concessions to Protestants and thus encourage a, united Ireland. That the Northern fundamentalist Protestant alsoopposed divorce is quietly ignored.

Nevertheless the vote signifcantly damages the credibility of Fitzgerald’s ‘Constitutional, his support for a ‘new Ireland’ and the democratic gloss on the throughtly reactionary Hillsborough deal. Not only has it failed to deliver anything substantial to Nationalist workers in the North, it has failed the cause of democracy in the South.

The marxist analysis of Peoples Democracy is confirmed in that those who deny the struggle for national liberation are incapable of delivering on civil rights. This is one of the messages that anti-imperialists must drive home both North and South following the referendum.

The most immediate fallout from the referendum defeat is the continued offensive of the right. Their next target is the Clinics which provide pregnancy councilling and abortion referral facilities. At present they are taking court action against the Well Women Centre in Dublin. All those who voted ‘Yes’ must now rally to the defense of the clinics including DAG who must be convinced that divorce is not an issue separate from the rest of the struggles confronting women. The campaign to defend the clinics must be open tc all who for whatever reason support them staying open.

This however cannot be the political basis of the clinics campaign. It is high time a clear line was drawn and a restatement was made of the principles which the women’s movement have stood for. Thus we must be quite clear that it is the right of women to control their own fertility, their own bodies and their own lives which is the nub of the issue in the clinics campaign. The right wing has denied the right o!

women to abortion in their own country, now they intend tc stop women exercising their choice elsewhere. It is on this issue which all those claiming to stand for women’s rights ang.

freedom generally must take a stand on. In particular the anti-imperialist movement must take the initiative in defending the clinics and in attempting to win over and mobilise the people who voted yes in the referendum. We must learn the lesson that avoiding the real arguments and issues as happened in the divorce campaign will not lead to victory. Peoples Democracy will play its part in trying to advance the clear political lead which is now necessary following the divorce defeat and will be launching a propaganda campaign demanding the separating of church and state. A special responsibility also rests on the Republican movement to put Ard Fheis policies on these issues into practice. As we have said already however above all, women must rely on themselves first and foremost!

ANN CONWAY.

page 8

THE CRISIS OF THE TRADE

UNION MOVEMENT

The antics of the National leadership of the Irish trade union.

movement at this years ICTU annual conference in Belfast underlined more graphically than at any time in recent memory the crisis afflicting the movement. Blissfully unaware of their stirring role in an event that bordered on: farce at times the majority of delegates voted resolution after -resolution which flew in the face of the repressive reality the working class of this country live in. A random glance at some of the decisions made at conference illustrates well the mental condition afflicting the trade union bureaucracy when they are confronted by political and social realities.

UNIONS ABSTAIN

A resolution from Derry Trades council proposing that the ICTU constitution be changed to to allow for ‘Politics’ to be discussed was overwhelmingly defeated on the basis that it could destroy ICTU’s unity. This attitude was explained on the opening day of the conference when the out-going: President Jim McCusker appealed for the trade union movement to refuse to take positions on one side or the other of the debate on the Anglo-Irish accord.

So The trade union movement takes no position on the issue which has been on the lips of politicians of all shades, has’ filled the editorial colums of newspapers and the news and current affairs programmes of radio and TV. This is supposed ot maintain the unity of the Trade union movement. In McCusker’s own words; ““To those who seek to divide us, I say the trade union movement rises above the sectarian quagmire’’ Similarly a reiteration of congress policy condemning violence to achieve political aims was passed. The emptiness of such pledges was recognised by incoming President John Carroll who said he would not like it to be seen as condemning those driven to violence in self defence by oppression in South Africa, Central America and Poland.

Both Jim McCusker and John Carroll would be hard put to deny that the six county state is now, and has always been, rampant with sectarian discrimination, bigotry and repression directed at the nationalist minority. They cannot deny that the sectarian nature of the 6 county state was the root cause of the revolt of the nationalist population. Yet they see fit to condemn ‘violence’ (in reality Republican violence, as the other forms of violence predate the beginnings of such condemnations). The hypocrisy of such condemnations is self-evident, coming after decisions not to discuss and have no opinion on the political situation out of which the violence emanates.

SECTARIANISM

THe trade union movement has always risen above the ‘sectarian quagmire’ in order to ignore the sectarian reality which it is best placed to confront. For example within all the major employers in the 6 counties where Catholics are systematically excluded from jobs or promotion possibilities.

What was new was the fact that loyalist bigotry was building up to a new height of hatred and violence to reassert their | sectarian privileges in the same month of July that conference -was held. The most telling feature of this nonsense was the Loyalist pickets outside the hall who demonstrated no matter how much you bent over to appease them they still thought the ICTU was basically a republican organisation which threatened their position.

This refusal to take a position on the major political political question facing the Irish working class dooms the trade union movement to political irrelevancy. No wonder the often repeated calls for an end to sectarianism are ignored. Their justification for this position on the grounds of maintaining workers unity ignore the effective partition of the trade union movement between North and South, the unions failure to combat sectarian employment practices and the fact that such unity dissolvers at the first test. The recent Loyalist one day strike shattered one myth about the bureaucracy’s claim to unite wirkers. Their attempts not to offend loyalist workers are miserable failures. They have no influence over these workers and their whole justification for ‘no politics’ is thus completely false. In practice it amounts to no republican or socialist politics and a failure to defend Nationalist workers.

BREAD AND BUTTER

Uutside of condemnations of ‘violence’ and appeals for ‘unity’ the major justification for the refusal to deal with questions related to the national struggle has been that unions shéuld concentrate on the ‘real’ issues facing workers. That is, the so-called ‘bread and butter’ issues. Indeed many if not most leading trade unionists owe loyalty to political parties which share similiar views. The Labour party, Communist party and workers party are all of such ilk and have maintained the schism-between the struggle for national and economic freedom. Of course there are major challenges facing workers on the ‘bread and butter’ issues but congress failed just as spectacualarly to put forward solutions here. There has been no let up in pouring the burden of the economic crisis onto the working class. Yet the main discussions at congress on pay and conditions show a lack of reality that would be laughable if it weren’t so serious for the working class. By a large majority it was decided to seek renewed (‘national understandings’ as unions had failed to obtain satisfactory pay deals since the employer’s side decided to abandon such deals when the 1979 agreement ran out.

There are several reasons why such an approach is doomed to failure. Besides been a rush into cloud cuckoo land by leaders who are prepared to grasp at any scheme which can cover their lack of strategy, it is in reality a capitulation which marks a new level in retreats and surrenders to the government’s monitarist onslaught. All the other fine words about making shorter working hours a priority, for a minimum wage and maximum cash increases are meaningless if the’ objective of a national understanding remains a central one the trade union movement.

John Carroll’s justification that; ‘‘national understandings were not just about how much pay increases and for how long, they were about improving the purchasing power and living standards of the people

\ page 9 “mn: Nita Mas

IRISH TRANSPORT <

GENERAL WORKERS

UNION

® The militancy of Irish workers has been frittered away by U) : ‘their leadership. 4 2 trade unions represented. They had to take into account educatiion, health and a whole range of social and economic issues’’. is totally cynical. How Carroll proposes improving purchasing power and living standards without a strategy on pay betrays an example of pure bureaucratic gobbledegook.

The other supposed compensatory aims in health, education and social issues are precisely in these areas which have been under concerted attack for at least the last 6 years. We cannot believe that even with ICTU’s ban on politics they can’t have been unaware that the government’s programme ‘Building on Reality’ and almost every statement by politicians in the same period was on the need to decimate the public sector. That is why national understandings were dropped in the first place. What mutual ‘understanding’ does the bureaucracy hope to arrive at with a Coalition bent on open class warfare and a policy which aims to make the working class and poor pay for the economic mess? There is no reason to believe that the present government or opposition will change course as these measures are dictated by larger forces. The world capitalist crisis, the big powers and the multinational enterprises which dominate the world economy are the real forces determining the Coalition’s policy which it itself has no decisive power in influencing.

NATURE OF BUREAUCRACY

Anti-imperialists have always maintained that trade union and Labour leaders who betrayed on the national question would inevitably sell out on the ‘bread and butter’ issues.

This equation, while basically true, does not adaquately explain the inter-relationship between the two. In fact the reverse can be just as valid. There has always been an economic and social basis to imperialist domination. Peoples Democracy has always maintained that the trade union bureaucracy (excepting individuals) is a pro-imperialist bloc which stands in the way of the national and social liberation of the working class. Yet the majority of the trade union leadership are based in the 26 counties and have scant contact with the oppressed of the 6 counties and even less regard for them. Their pro-imperialist instincts are developed not primarily by the crisis in the 6 counties but by their participation in the struggles of the southern working class.

Of course the historic roots of the Labour and trade union movement’s pro-imperialist politics are based on its civil war attitudes but its continuation depends on contmporary reality.

The main source of failure of the trade union leaderships interventions into struggles is that it abstracts these struggles from their political reality. There is a fiction that we are dealing with a normal boss-worker relationship as in the major capitalist countries. If we took a look at the modern Irish economy as it developed since the 50’s with the ending of protectionsism we see this is far from the case. When protectionism failed the economy was opened to multinational penetration and the subsequent foreign borrowing which wag used to bolster this artificial economy. This whole period was characterised by a deepening of imperialist domination and of dependency and was reflected on a political level by EEC entry, erosion of neutrality and government economic pains(Building on reality) which are pure and’ simple IMF diktats. The IR£21 billion foreign debt and the withdrawal of funds from the public sector which are required ‘to service it, the huge flight of capital caused by multinational looting are all problems which are related to national sovereignty. This is the reality the trade union leadership refuses to confront and why they have departed so far from their membership.

MILITANCY OF WORKERS

Almost from the inception of the new policy there has been a rising graph of workers militancy, The actions of workers and their leadership took off in opposite directions. Right through

page 10 the 1970’s Ireland had more working days per employee lost through strikes than any other country in Europe except Italy.

In terms of unofficial strikes Irish workers had an’ unparalleled record, with over 50% of strikes unofficial. At the same time the bureaucracy concluded a series of national wage agreements and national understandings all of which had no-strike clauses and served more to present a picture of, stable investment opportunities for multinationals than to forward the interests of Irish workers. The basis of union solidarity was attacked by the introduction of two-tier; picketing. More revealing still has been their attitude to multi-national penetration. Sweetheart deals were concluded by the major unions, sometimes before a brick was laid in new factories and the terms were imposed on the newly recruited workforce which had no choice of union. Implicit in the deals was the promise of no union trouble. Ferenka in Limerick was the most notable but by no means exceptional example of such deals. When the workers decided to change unions the factories closed. Another factor in economic policy was the decimation of previously protected industry due to unequal competition im ‘the EEC. Car assembly, leather and shoe manufacturers, flour milling, paper milling, and a whole host of other industries went to the wall. Most of these had the advantage of being native industries based on local raw materials and skills. The bureaucracy’s attitude was to sell jobs for redundancy payments and when some workers resisted such as Clondalkin and Ranks they were tricked and in the case of Ranks thrown out of their union and their relatives removed by guards from Liberty Hall when the strike leaders were in jail. These types of retreats by the bureaucracy are inevitable as the prolonged nature of the present economic crisis threatens by its very depth and intensity to expose that the roots of the crisis are based in the partition settlement and the economic domination which this allowed to continue.

Their history of collaboration within partition ensures they can do nothing else. The problems facing the working class in the economic sphere are first and foremost rooted in imperialist domination. The dynamic of their struggles are anti-imperialist and the bureaucracy develops pro-imperialist policies in so far as they prevent that dynamic developing and taking on political expression. That is why, for instance, they lacked any strategy in the PAYE tax campaign and set up straw targets such as the self-employed and all farmers while the real culprits - the international banks that recieved the equivalent of all the PAYE take in interest charges this year, went scott free. The tax free subsidised foreign plants, which exported IR£4,034 million profits between 1980 - 85 were never targeted.

QUESTION UF STRATEGY

These questions have major implications for anti-imperialists and republicans. The defeat of imperialism is dependent on a fusion and link-up of all those struggling against imperialist oppression. The struggles of the working class, who are the major force for change in society, while being objectively anti-imperialist will not automatically become conciously so.

Nor will they spontaniously fuse with the struggles of the minority in the 6 counties. These are major questions of strategy which must be resolved while bourgois forces plan a defeat of the southern working class and a decisive setback for the national struggle as 4 whole.

The working class are as yet undefeated and decisive battles have not yet been joined. What is certain is that under their present leaderships they face a gradual erosion of their combativity in the long term. The continuing jobs crisis, with no solution other than the cheap labour schemes of the government and the resumption of mass emigration of young people means that for many youth there is little motivation for . them to make up the ranks of the trade union movement in the future. The fact that ICTU supported the ‘self aid’ gimmick uncritically shows their complete lack of alternative. The danger is shown in that not only has trade unionism declined in numbers as a result of unemployment but the percentage of workers organised has fallen from 55% to below 50%.

The implications of this for anti-imperialists are that the forces necessary to defeat imperialism, the working class and their allies, will not be mobilised unless anti-imperialists can provide leadership and strategy for them against all aspects of their oppression. It is only by mobilising against their felt oppression (and for Southern workers this is primarily economic that they can become fully politically concious that the roots of their exploitation are based on partition and imperialist domination. It is a resposibility of antiimperialists to begin to struggle for an open campaign in the trade union movement for an alternative strategy to the defeatism of the bureaucracy. The alienation and discontent which is endemic within the workers movement ensures an opportunity for a campaign to regain the unions for their membership. The issues on which the bureaucracy have to be confronted will only be worked out »fully in the course of the broadest possible campaign and discussion. Below are some of the demands which Peoples Democracy believes will be central.

Support for the struggle of the nationalist minority in the 6 counties. Against the Anglo-Irish deal Against sectarian discrimination Confront the Loyalist veto Disband the RUC/ UDR Release of political prisoners No national understandings and the persuit of sectional interests - for free collective bargaining and callective action on a national level to defeat the government No repayment of the national debt out of taxpayer money No cuts in public services except in ‘defence’ and ‘security’ Withdraw troops and gardai from the border and from strike breaking roles No two tier picketing KEVIN McCRACKEN

The following article is taken from the May/June issue of the Civil and Public Services Union journal and is written by one of its delegates to the ICTU congress held in Belfast. It shows that only an anti-imperialist answer is adaquate to facing up to the problem of the national debt and. provides an example of how links must be made between the economic exploitation of imperialism in the South and the political struggle against it in the North.

TAXATION AND THE

NATIONAL DEBT

It is a popular belief that mean farmers, solicitors and crafty accountants are the only forces preventing a more ‘equitable taxation system from being introduced. This, however, is more than a little inaccurate. The: main obstacle to a fairer tax system is the outflow of multinational profits and repayments on the national debt.

To understand how this came about we must go back in history to the founding of the State. The lack of any native heavy industry in Ireland is due to the refusal of the banks to invest at home. They were the major source of capital in the South and invested their funds in London. Therefore the only way that the Irish economy could have been developed in the interests of the Irish people would have been for the Government to regulate the outflow of capital -by the banks. No Government (not even the Fianna Fail governments of the 1930s who were elected on a radical programme of confronting big business and the ranchers) was prepared to take this step, afraid of the social forces it might stir up and the belt of a crozier that might result. The only way capital could be acquired from outside of Ireland was through the opening up of the economy by ending the protection that native Irish industry enjoyed.

It was only under these strict conditions that the World Bank was prepared to give loans necessary to build the infrastructure that would attract multi-national companies. Thus, the Industrial Development Authority was set up and it brought in the multi-nationals on the basis of low wages, capital grants of 35%—-60%, subsidised training and tax free profits. As a result of the opening up of the economy the traditional Irish industries — shoemaking, flour milling and clothing went to the wall. However, the multi-nationals ‘themselves were external to the Irish economy and their profits were withdrawn instead of being re-invested. Indeed many of the multi-national companies set up assembly kit factories, with components being imported from several other countries, assembled in Ireland and then re-exported to take advantage of favourable tax laws. All of this resulted in a situation where the base of taxation was moved almost totally to the working class. In 1985 the official! figures for the outflow of funds from the State were: Profits sent abroad IR£1,335,000,000 Interest on State foreign debt IR£8 10,000,000 Other interest paid abroad IR£609,000,000 Gross outflow IR£2,754,000,000 | age 11 Therefore 27/, billion pounds left the State last year to feather the nests of multi-national bankers and businessment. But this is not all, the principal repayments are calculated separately? and in 1985 they amounted to: IR£1,398,000,000. So we come to a final figure of IR£4,152,000,000, which left Ireland and headed into th blue yonder. : This money would have built many hospital and schools, it could have helped to ease the misery and.

‘ poverty experienced by the one million people who are officially below the poverty line.

As can be seen from the figures I quoted above. the _ entire take from PAYE taxation goes to service the national debt. The choice facing the working class is either to say no to the national debt or face total destruction of social services. What is required is a government which will renegotiate the national debt, tax the multi-national companies, strictly regulate the flow of capital abroad and tax the Irish rich. Using the money resulting from this the Government could develop social services and a national plan for the agricultural sector and the building of Irish heavy industry. . But neither Irish capitalism nor British capitalism would stand idly by while this was going on. Then some people might get a shock when they discovered the true nature of the presence of British armed forces in, the occupied Six Counties. Because the only Government capable of carrying out such a plan would be a Socialist Government. I fully realise the outcome of the next election will not result in such a government but it is what is needed. No capitalist party is going to implement policies which as a whole favour the ordinary workers and small farmers of Ireland.

The Irish Congress of Trade Unions carry a heavy, responsibility in this area. It is up to the ICTU to open up a debate in the Trade Union movement on the political needs of the working class and to call a conference open to all sections of the Labour and Trade Union movement to plan the way forward.

PAT CORCORAN

PUBLIC SERVICES ‘STAFF

[cs] ANNUAL CONFERENCE

page 12

| LETTER

PRISONERS SPEAK OUT!

It is now eight months since the Hillsborough accord was signed and sealed yet nothing tangible has been delivered.

What keeps it in the public spotlight is the Unionist response rather than the substance it supposedly contains. A real basis for the Unionist fears rather than a percieved one is hard to detect. Perhaps the Unionists genuinely feel that the British are about to impose a political solution which would weaken partition and subsequently alter the balance of political forces in Ireland. The general media view and one shared by many political analysts is that some form of political solution is in the making. However it is more likely that, contrary to this general opinion, the British in line with past behaviour are in no way serious about implementing and sustaining any significant political initiative and that they. are simply opting for - as they have always done - a military solution. Furthermore it is incorrect to see the ‘accord’ as an actual agreement.

between equal partners. Rather, it is an imposed arrangement which reflects the political and ideological hegemony exercised by Britain over the island of Ireland.

' That the arrangement ever came to be seen, as an ‘agreement between two sovereign states’ has much to do with the misconception about the supposedly equal extent of concern displayed by the political establishments in Britain and the 26 counties regarding the rise of Sinn Fein. Upon reflection it is difficult to see how both the above parties could be equally aprehensive about the Sinn Fein phenomenon. From the point of view of the British the most that Sinn Fein can do is alter the political balance within the Nationalist community in the North. But this in no way effects the structurally imposed and protected political balance which exists in the North as a result of partition.

Furthermore, Sinn Fein’s large reliance on a conservative bedrock of support both in the South of Ireland and in the United States has given rise to an obscure Janus-faced ideology which in turn finds organisational expression in a political party ill-equipped for serious revolutionary development. This can do little to convince the British that Sinn Fein pose a long-term radical threat. On the other hand, however, the Southern establishment feel they have less cause to be optimistic; the structural limitations faced by Sinn Fein in the North don’t apply in the South. Plagued with a.

debt -ridden economy and faced with the potential disintegration of the existing concensus, the establishment can draw little consolation from the fact that in the South the distinction between Rebuplicanism and conservatism is often blurred. Sinn Fein’s potential to gain a ‘protest inspired’ vote from the disaffected in the urban areas and to appear as an extreme version of Fianna Fail in the rural areas is sufficient to send shivers down the Fine Gael - Labour spines.

It is only when the arrangement is viewed in the context of the British and Southern establishments percieving the potential threat posed by Sinn Fein in widely differing ways can any sense be made of its origins, or an insight acquired into the direction it is most likely to take. The Southern establishment fear of Sinn Fein prompted it to throw a life-line to the SDLP in the form of the Forum. That the British responded to this” Forum in the arrogant ‘Out, Out, Out’? manner was nof only a lack of concern about Sinn Fein Potential but was also an exploratory exercise in establishing just how far they could push Fitzgerald. The purpose behind the push was to ascertain just how susceptible the South would be to British’ dictated terms for a military solution - not a political one.

Somewhat paradoxically, it may seem, the British were actually aided in this process by the increasing electoral success of Sinn Fein - the greater the precieved threat to the Southern establishment, the more susceptible it would become to any initiative which might curb Sinn Fein. In view of the total lack of political content to emerge since the arrangement it can only be assumed that the British spelt out to the Dublin politicians that the key to success lay in a coherent security policy aimed at defeating the IRA which in turn would remove Sinn Fein’s raison d’etre. Not only would Dublin have the task of co-operating in the military initiative, they would also have to package it up concealed in green political jargon and sell it to the Nationalist community in the North. Viewed in this manner it is therefore no surprise that despite the arrangement’s huff and puff it has still to blow down one single house of repression. Objectively, Nationalists stand to gain nothing and Unionists stand to lose the same amount. How successful the arrangement will be depends ultimately not on the unionists but rather on the ability of Republicans to meet the challenge it poses.

Whether the British succeed in their aim to crush the IRA and cause the demise of Sinn Fein remains to be seen. To say that they cannot succeed is absurd. The IRA and Sinn Fein, since 1922, have experienced a number of defeats. Historically, within the confines of the Northern state Sinn Fein have made no impact in the absence of IRA activity. That various IRA campaigns have ended in defeat is as much linked to their having no effective political organisation - doing radical socialgroundwork concerning issues which are not directly linked to, or immediately supportive of, the armed struggle - as it was connected to British military capacity. Although many Republicans argue that the situation today is different and that Sinn Fein is a radical progressive organisation complementing the armed struggle of the IRA, this view hasn’t been bourne out in Sinn Fein’s response to the new arrangement, a response which seems to say ‘We've been through it all before so we’ll be alright this time’ Perhaps Sinn Fein with its substantial number of elected representatives are of the opinion that they need only hold their own and that a combination of Fianna Fail, Unionist and IRA opposition will ultimately bring the arrangement to a halt. If this is so it is a dangerous notion which reflects political inertia, not activism. The interests of constitutional nationalism (as expressed by Fianna Fail) and Unionism impose limitations on the extent to which they will be prepared to go with their opposition, while the IRA’s interests necessitate that they bury the arrangement they too are effectively constrained by the amount of meaning which can be attached to their activities by those on behalf of whom the struggle is supposedly waged (i.e. the majority of the Irish people). A reliance on armed struggle and nationalist sentiment alone can only but seriously dilute such meaning.

Armed struggle can’t always be seen as the panacea for unemployment or as a solution to the problems faced bf the.

battered wife. This is much more true in the South than it is , in the North, as in the former nationalism is no longer the integrating force it once was, nor in the country as a whole can any discernable capitalist impulse towards unification be detected. In circumstances of this type slogan or policies based on the; ‘One Ireland, one people - the only alternative’

theory are meaningless. The fRA can only effectively defeat the arrangement if it is complemented by a professional political machine continuously upgrading the socialist content of its party, programme and ideology, and which. ties together every strand of oppressed thought and form of protest in order that the oppressed can organise themselves and prepare for extra-parliamentary activity. Elected representatives have a part to play but they can only be a small cog in a big wheel. US support, moral and otherwise, like that of conservative republicanism will ultimately contribute to the struggle walking the treadmill of dispair.

Sinn Fein are obliged to fulfill a new revolutionary role.

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page 13 answer to that question. In this context the London-Dublin arrangement could provide an answer - the wrong one .and one which will ultimately give rise to more questions than it answers. Is the endless process to go on? Only the Republican movement can decide on that.

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REVIEWS

LOOKING BACK ON

THE HUNGER STRIKES

Special Catagory Status - Political Status was phased out of the 6 - county prison system in 1976 by the British Administration. Ciaran Nugent was the first prisoner to begin the protest. The author describes it thus: ‘*He was put through the conveyor process and imprisoned in one of the new facilities in Long Kesh on 14th September, 1976. He refused the prison uniform. Two days later he accepted the uniform for a visit with his mother. He had in mind a little demonstration of his own. While on the visit he began to strip off the uniform. He was not a criminal, he declared, as he stood in his underpants. And if they expected him to wear their criminal uniform, they would have to nail it on his back. And so Cieran Nugent became the first blanket man’’.

THE PRISONERS STORY

In March 1978 in response to beatings and harassment by the screws the Republican prisoners refused to leave their cells -and thus began the no wash/no slop out protest.

‘Slop buckets were not forthcoming so their excrement and ‘ urine accumulated in the pots. The cells became very dirty.

Waste overflowed onto the floor. The screws finally began coming around with the slop buckets to empty the pots of.

urine and excrement. But sometimes they kicked the pots over or spolled the contents onto the mattresses, the blankets.

-or the prisoners themselves. The men’s own bodily waste was now to be used as a weapon against them’’, In response the prisoners poured their urine under the cell doors and smeared their excrement on the walls.

“By June 1978 after about 13 weeks of the no-wash no slop-out protest all furniture had been removed from the cells. The men sleeping on damp, soggy, dirty sponge matresses were getting filthier by the day. The were all undernourshed and underweight, with pale, scaby, yellowing skin. They were sleeping, living and eating on the floor. The cells were filled with huge piles of putrifying food. It was three months since most of them had had a shower’’.

There were now 360 Republican prisoners on the blanket and this was the situation which led up to the hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981. To those who had been involved in the protest movement against the withdrawal of political status there were two foci to the protest. First, and most importantly, there were the prisoners themselves. Their indomitable courage and persistence denied the British government the quick victory that the brutal regime they had initiated in the prisons in 1976 depended on for the success of the criminalisation policy. of which the withdrawal of political status was a component part. As it turned out it was the rock on which the whole policy foundered. Secondfy there was the protest movement outside the prisons.

This began with the relatives of the prisoners themselves.

The Relatives Action Committees(RACs) began on an ad-hoc basis but gradually built up a committee structurewhich by december 1976 was attempting co-ordination throughout the North. Many of the women who ran these committees had, _little organised political experience before and participation in RACs in support of husbands and brothers in Long Kesh (and the small band of women prisoners inArmagh who began’ a similiar protest on 7th January 1980 as a result of been’ beaten and kicked by male warders. This escalated a protest they had begun the previous March) was their first sustained political activity. They made it up as they went along - small pickets and marches and on occasion 24 hour vigils were women clad only in underwear and blankets occupied tents and stalis as a way of drawing attention to the plight of the prisoners. Left wing groups participated in these committees alongside the Republican movement. Eventually the work of the RACs was subsumed into the work of the National 'H-Block Committee which was set up at an open conference - in the Green Briar in October 1979. In 1980 it became the H-Block/Armagh committee. The aim of the committee was to broaden the scope of the protest and encourage all those who supported the aim of the protest to come together and put maximum pressure on the British government. As an aid to this process the prisoners crystallised their protest into the ‘65 demands’’. 1. The right to wear their own clothes 2. Free association with other prisoners 3. The right not to do prison work 4. Full 50% remission of their sentences 5. Normal visits, parcels, educational and recreational facilities Tom Collin’s 600 page book attempts to set out in detail the background to the protest and culminates in the 1981 hunger strike itself. A chatper is devoted to each of the 10 prisoners who died - their family background and early lives, how they came to be in the H-Blocks and detailed and often harrowing accounts of their deaths. The first two chapters describe the build up of the protest up to the first hunger strike of late 1980. This is accomplished largely through the device of following the progress of one prisoner - IRSP prisoner Tony O'Hara, brother of Patsy. There are two other chapters. One of these. the last chapter, as well as assessing the political effects of the hunger strikes, describes Father Faul’s role in ending the hunger strikes through putting pressure on the families to give premission for the medical staff at Long Kesh to revive comatose hunger strikers. This was largely successful in September when first Matt Devlin, in a coma after 52 days was taken off by his mother and on 26th September Liam McCloskey acceded to his mother’s 5-hour plea and he came off after 55 days on hunger strike. On the 3rd October 1971 the 217 day hunger strike was officially ended by the prisoners. That evening in a statement the prisoners said;

Bambury ignores the political significance of th Northern struggle. -**We have been robbed of the hunger strike as an effective protest weapon principally because of the successful campaign waged against our distressed relatives by the ‘Catholic Hierarchy, aided and abetted by the Catholic Catholic Hierarchy, aided and abetted by the Irish establishment {the SDLP and the Free State political parties] which took no effective action against the British government and id everything to encourage hopelessness among our kith and kin......We extend our solidarity to the families of the dead hunger strikers and to all our families and friends. We especially thank the National H-Block Armagh committee and all support groups and urge them to continue with their trojan commitment to the achievement of the 5 demands by whatever means we believe necessary and expedient. We rule nothing out. Under no circumstances are we going to devalue the memory of our dead comrades by submitting ourselves to a dehumanising and degrading fregime’’.

THE CARDINAL ARCHBISHOP

‘The longest chapter in the book is called ‘The Cardinal Archbishop’ and is devoted to Cardinal O’Fiach’s involvement with the impasse in the H - Blocks. It is in this chapter that the biggest weakness in the book is typified.

Yom Collins has written the H-Block/Armagh committee practically out of history. It is referred to in passing several times but no attempt is made to describe its composition, how it was set up and what relationship it had to the forces that were set in motion in Irish society during the hunger strike. Consequently the size and scope of the protests in ireland and abroad, the elections of Bobby Sands and Owen Carron to Westminster, the local government elections of 1981, the Dail elections which turned Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew into TDs and recorded supstantial support for other prisoner candidates and which was one of the factors leading to the fall of Haughy'’s administration are described briefly in passing with little attempt to analyse their significance. The industrial action taken by tens of thousands of Irish workers during the hunger strikes is ignored altogether. In place of the protest campaign Tom Collins has substituted the church and a romantic notion of his own of what the hunger strikers represented in the Irish nation.

‘It is a sad and depressive world of suffering and slow death.

But it is also a world of men with families who are filled with at times charged with - hope: Hope for a world in which men could lay down their lives so selflessly. Hope for the fulfill- ‘ment of the dream of freedom in another world where - ‘** ina flash, at a trumpet crash!”’ - all things would be made new.

page 15 Hope even for this world; even for Ireland; even in this generation. Tiocfaidh ar la! Inexorably their day will come.

And surely it will come more quickly for what they were: and did.” The book rises frequently to this kind of overwritten cpiphany. its reverential hero-worshipping tone towards the hunger-strikers takes the place of searching analysis and frequently obscures the political issues involved in the hunger strikes. Never is this more glaring than in the chapter on Cardinal O’Faich. Clearly he has had unprecedented accesss to the Cardinal. As well as quoting in detail many letters between him and British officials it gives candid accounts of the Cardinal’s private opinions and details of private meetings - for example with Thatcher at the height of the hunger strikes and with leaders of Sinn Fein in 1980 who were anxious to find internediaries to resolve the H-Block crisis before the hunger strike began. Clearly Cardinal O’Fiach was anxious to set the record straight, to get his version of the chruch’s involve ‘own on record. He is well aware that how the church performed during this crisis for the anti-unionist people will be used as a yardstick of its commitment to social justice for a lo ng time to come. And how do they come out of it? Well, if one is to accept at face value the picture presented by Tom Collins in his chapter ‘The Cardinal Archbishop’ - well. Not so well if one places it into the.context of the real protest campaign that was going on in support of the prisoners. Collins, however, has denied us this opportunity because he has ignored the real campaign that was organised by the National H-Block Armagh comittee and substituted it with the behind the scenes negotiations of the church first through Cardinal O’Faich and later on through the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace(ICJP). Tom Collins describes the Cardinal’s and the Church's position on Irish Unity thus: ‘The Cardinal had thought a lot about the problem. He was Irish of the Irish, and had always seen himself that way. But he recognised that some of his people did not feel as he did, and he had to be pastor for them as well. He'd been reflecting on this dilemma for years, the church as an organisation had no position at all towards Ireland as a nation.

Its attitude was indifferent, except in so far as one set of political circumstances might be considered more favourable to its mission than another. And a situation where its people -were comfortable in their freedom was not necessarily better for the church than a situation where they were forced to live under a hostile regime...... Some felt that the Catholics of Dublin, who lived under [rish rule, were more ‘prone to materialism than the poorer Catholics of Belfast who lived under British rule’’.

page 16 WE

SALUTE THE

HUNGER

STRIKERS —

Francis Hughes Kevin Lynch Ray McCreesh Bobby Sands Micky Devine Leaving aside the implications in this evaluation of the religious benefits of poverty, there is a contradiction here and it is not surprising that as the hunger strike progressed this contradiction opened up wide chasms of credibility.

Cardinal O'Fiach is an ambiguous figure in the Church and the author uses him to good effect to obscure the role of the church in the protests as an institution. With his South Armagh background and gaelic scolasticism he is not really a typical figure in the church _ hierarchy. His ‘Sewers of Calcutta’ statement of July '78 was the first time that conditions in Long Kesh made news throughout the world. He made no bones about his position on special : Kieran Doherty catagory status. . ; Patsy O'Hara ‘The authorities refuse to admit that these prisoners are in a different catagory from the ordinary, yet everything about their trials and family background indicates that they are different’. He continued working quietly behind the scenes. Yet if one tries to reconcile his above statement with the one quoted about his views on Irish Unity it becomes quite clear why his efforts were ineffectual. There were political implicatons which flowed from his realisation that the prisoners were ‘*special”’ that given his position in the church it would have been very uncomfortable for him to carry through. Because he was unwilling to join the protest campaign the British administration realised early on that they had effectively neutralised him. BEDE e 1] Tom McElwee Joe McDonne The same was true also of the church as a_ whole, though more glaringly. The involvement of the its official organ - the ICJP - was a shameful episode. Bishop Mahony ofDublin, chairman of the ICJP, said some time after: the hunger strike:

‘All along we were against granting political status to the IRA prisoners, To grant political status would help the IRA and we couldn’t do that. What we were looking for was a compromise. The IRA would have as their goal not only getting the British Army out of Ireland but undermining the democratic process in the South of Ireland.....0ne can’t forget the crimes most of those in prison are guilty of, even though they were tried in special courts; attempted murder, bombing, all kinds of violence’’.

And in June °81 in the middle of the hunger strikes the Irish Bishops published the following statement: ‘*We implore the hunger strikers and those who direct them, to reflect deeply on the evil of their actions and their consequences. The contempt for human life, the incitment to revenge, the exploitation of the hunger strikes to further a campaign of murder, the intimidation of the innocent, the initiation of children into violence, all this constitutes an appalling mass of evil’’.

All this from an institution which “took no position at all towards Ireland as a nation’’. These were the people who were trying to resolve the hunger strike as Joe McDonnel lay close to death.

WHAT CAN IDO?

The involvement of Haughey and Fitzgerald is chronicled handwringing assurances of concern and behind the scenes pressure on the British government, but because they were not able to go the whole way and join the campaign in support of the five demands the British government had effectively neutralised their efforts. Meanwhile the prisoners kept dying. The plight of the Irish middle class is well summed up in the following scene where Cardinal O’Fiach came to the Hurson household for the wake of Martin Hurson who was from Cappagh in the Cardinal’s diocese.

“They gave him a cup of tea and a sandwich and Francie{Martin’s brother] went over and started talking to him - ‘Father, you’ve got the power of the Catholic Church.

And yet you didn’t do anything to save Martin - > The Cardinal was nodding his head sympathetically. ‘Young men like Martin’, Francie said ‘are dying on hunger strike, starving themselves to death for their country. They only wanted to be Irishmen, Father. They have proven themselves to be Irishmen. And you couldn’t even save their lives’.

‘Francie what can 1 do? I honour Martin. I’ve come here to the house to be with the Hurson family. But I have no power.

England has the power’. ”’ But they did have power. The one power that they could have used to save the hunger strikers. When Thatcher ignored their private approaches they could have taken to the streets with the campaign. But they didn’t and the British knew that the Irish middle classes North and South were effectively check-mated. In many ways they had as much to lose as the British had. Tom Collins book is required reading for anybody interested in the hunger strikes. It is an akward ungainly book.

‘It is written partly in documentary style and partly like a novel. The technique works only patchily. Obviously, a lot of time has been spent with the families although there are some key people whom, it is clear, he has not interviewed. The most glaring example of this is his treatment of Sinn Fein.

Like the H-Block Armagh committee they are dealt with scarcely at all. The book is littered with hostile reference to the ‘Provos’, the political movement to which the majority of protesting prisoners belonged. This sits oddly beside his reverential approach to the hunger strikers themselves.

There is a contradiction here which the book never resolves.

The picture he builds up of the prisoners is assembled largely through the accounts of the families and the picture that page 17 emerges is one of ordinary working class families - for the most part devoutly Catholic. And in the atmosphere of the hunger strikes and approaching death it is not surprising that this was an aspect that was stressed by all. But it is an incomplete picture that would have been rectified if the author had included more detailed analysis of the politics of the prisoners and the political movement to which they had given their allegiance - a side of them which many of their families admitted they had little knowledge of and didn’t understand. But his hostility to the Republican movement prevents him from doing this and apart from the ritual assertion of the fight being an age-old fight for Irish freedom the precise politics of those intimately involved with ‘the hunger strikers is at best ignored and frequently slandered. One of the ways he has made up for this is by substituting IRSP personnel (who clearly have co-operated externsively with the author) for those of Sinn Fein when he is presenting informed political comment. The result does justice to neither organisation and presents a one - sided analysis to key events in the campaign(e.g. the attitude of Sinn Fein to the early RAC’s on page 63) and an inadaquate picture of the real balance of forces of the political organisations involved in the campaign.

IT would not like to put anyone off reading this book.

There is much here that will move people and much that ts new and has not previously appeared in print. But the book should be approached cautiously. As a chronicle of the experiences of the hunger strikers and their families there is much that is fine in it. As a contirbution to an understanding of the political currents that moved and shaped the forces involved in the hunger strikes it is confused and woefully inadaquate.

JAMES MACKIN:

“THE IRISH HUNGER STRIKE”

BY TOM COLLINS

WHITE ISLAND BOOK COMPANY

PRICE £6.95

Books reviewed in this Journal are available from;

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BEEFAST 12

page 18

REPUBLICANS ANALYSE

‘DEAL

imperialists, the need to involve all the Irish people directly in What does the Anglo-Irish deal represent? What is the Republican movement's analysis of this agreement and their strategy for moving the revolution forward? Readers of Danny Morrison’s booklet will not find any clear answers to.

these questions. Indeed they are likely to end with an impression of continuing Republican confusion and uncertainty. Close reading will give some hints of a continuing strategic debaté in the Republican movement and «it is in these hints of continuing debate and discussion that we can find hope that republicans will meet the call for effective Jeadership. The booklet,’ containing the text of the Bobby Sands commemorative lecture given by DFanny Morrison in May, claims to examine-the Hillsborough agreement. In fact there is no detailed analysis of the deal. The central section hardly goes beyond a restatement of the main elements given in the text of the treaty and other references are scattered throughout the text. So on page 15 we are told; ‘no Sinn Fein statement or spokesperson ever referred to the Agreement as a sell-out or to the SDLP as having sold out’’. So what do they say? In the section ‘Republican Position’ the valuable point is made that Loyalist reaction to the agreement shows that their violence is not a response to the IRA but is their response to any nationalist attempt to achieve their rights. The booklet goes on to make the following points: @The implementation of the agreement is not worth such a violent Loyalist response.

WCatholics are being burnt out of their homes for an agreement that enshrines the Loyalist veto.

M@The Agreement has not been followed by any reforms or any change in the pattern of sectarianism and repression in the North. : @ Republicans should not rule out the possibility that Britain ‘may make concessions on these issues to back up constitutional nationalists.

This leaves us back where we started. If the deal is not a sellout then it contains substantial reforms won by the advance of the anti-imperialist movement. We should be able to identify these, and explain the need to press onward for revolutionary change around these advances. If it is a sell-out then we should be organising to defend ourselves and to expose the forces leading the betrayal.

Of course the Anglo-Irish deal is a sell-out. So why has the Republican movement fudged this central issue?

A reading of the section on the H-Block struggle gives us something of an answer. The main lesson taken from the struggle is of the importance of electoral intervention. Thus the forum report and the negotiations around the Anglo-Irish deal are seen solely as responses to the threat that Sinn Fein posed to the SDLP at the polls. This is certainly a major factor, but it tends to blind ‘Danny Morrison to the wider strategic and political background against which British policy is forged.

There are lots of other lessons to be learnt from the H-Block struggle - lessons on the need for political unity of antithe battle for freedom through mass struggle ans the need to bring all oppressed groups together in one struggle.

On eother lesson was posed in the H-Block struggle. That is that when it comes to the crunch Irish capitalism will stand shoulder to shoulder with its imperialist master and that a successful challenge means not just standing in elections against the capitalists but in unity with organised workers in a fight that links opposition to economic exploitation and deprivation with the fight against imperialism.

That’s the central issue in understanding this agreement.

what it does above all is recognise the increasing weight of the Irish capitalist class, the hold that they continues to have over the majority of Irish workers, and their role in supporting imperialist rule in Ireland. Through the Anglo-Irish deal they are brought into the front line and a successful defence consists first and foremost of exposing their collaboration and smashing their support amongst Irish workers.

An analysis by Sinn Fein that doesn’t deal with their calls for unity with the SDLP in the last two elections can’t hope to show the way forward. So the booklet can’t be described as a finished policy or a final statement. It is a position paper, summing up some elements of an ongoing debate but leaving many questions open. It finishes on this open note - calling on Republicans to develop strategies to suit conditions and to “face particular challenges to its traditional perceptions’’ ‘‘With some fexibility, through comradely debate and discussion, it can meet these challenges’’.

There are many other points that could be made. The analysis of Loyalism is insufficient, the vulnerability of British rule seems overstated and there is a particularly good quote from the Daily Telegraph about Britain’s use of the Anglo-Irish deal in international propaganda - revolutionists should read the booklet and see for themselves.

As an analysis of the Anglo- Irish deal and a strategic signpost for the struggle ‘The Hillsborough Agreement’ by Danny Morrison is inadaquate. As a glimpse into the internal discussion in the Republican movement it is of real interest.

Perhaps the most important point is that it has been published. At the last Sinn Fein Ard Fheis Gerry Adams.

made it clear that he saw the anti-imperialist movement as extending well beyond the Republican movement and their supporters. This booklet is the first doorway between the Republicans and that wider movement. It is perhaps worth while reminding Danny that the issue of electoral participation which he defends so strongly was no only resolved by internal debate but by actively involving, in open debate, all the anti-imperialist fighters in the H-Block movement. A similiar openess is needed now.

JOHN NORTH.

THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT

BY DANNY MORRISON

Published by Republican publications,

Page 19 «

IRELAND'S PERMANENT

REVOLUTION

There are many books written now about Ireland but very few from a socialist viewpoint which deal directly with the ‘problems and strategy of carrying out a successful revolution.

Even rarer is one whose title indicates that the author understands the real nature of the Irish revolution. With the title ‘Irelands Permanent Revolution’ this certainly seemed to.

be one of those books. What makes it more important is that it was written for an organisation, the Socialist Workers ‘Movement, actively seeking to implement its analysis in today’s struggles. It first may be necessary to explain what is meant by the term ‘Permanent Revolution’. In the case of Ireland it means that the democratic tasks of the revolution (national unity, independence and political democracy) can only be achieved under the leadership of the working class. Only under a workers government and state can these objectives be achieved and secured; only a socialist revolution can achieve a united Ireland. This also implies that what appear as purely democratic demands can be revolutionary, acting as transitional demands which bridge the gap between the call for simple reforms and the maximum objective of socialism.

It is easier to understand what this means when it is being compared to the ‘stages’ théory of revolution fo which it is directly counterposed. Chris Banbury does this firstly through explaining how Stalinism, represented in Ireland by the Communist party and Workers party applies it to the Irish situation: “According to this the first stage was to secure ‘bourgeois democracy’ in both Irish states. Stage two would be to achieve a united capitalist Ireland. The final, third stage would be the achievement of socialism. This meant that socialist demands, which fitted ‘stage three’ could not be raised at a time when the struggle was simply concerned with achieving democratic government - the object of ‘stage one’. [Page 61] This hardened out and theoriesed view can be compared with the Republican movements more pragmatic looser stagest ideas. Banbury quotes Gerry Adams to illustrate his point: “We genuinely believe that when the struggle for independence is completed and the democratic process re-established, the best solution is decentralised socialism and government structures.

There is the order of priorities: first the struggle for indpendence has to be won, then they will think about socialism.’’ [Page 75] Both these views are corectly rejected in the book in favour of ‘permanent revolution’, first elaborated by the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky but which is also close to the arguements which Connolly put forward, quite independly, during his life. Thus Bambury quotes Connolly: “The national and economic freedom of the Irish people must ‘be sought in the same direction, viz the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic.”’ [Page 37] ; It is only when one gets to the last chapter however ‘Legacy — of ‘no other reason. that it becomes clear that Bambury too rejects permanent revolution and that the book’s title is a complete misnomer.

This becomes crystal clear on page 79.

“The idea that the Northern troubles would automatically spill over was based on the belief that the South remained in essence a neo-colony of Britain, dominated not politically but economically. But by the 1970’s this was no longer true.’’ In other words Ireland, or at least the 26 counties is not dominated by British imperialism; the most he talks of is the British imperialist rule’. [page &1] Apparently ‘Partition reflected the different intérests © of the two sections of Ireland’s capitalist class’. [Page 34]. Did it not also reflect the interests of British imperialism?

Apparently not. Britain isn’t mentioned. In fact the author repeats this view at the end of the book: ‘*Partition serves the interests of the ruling class, North and South of the border’ [Page 84}.

So the sole enemy of Irish workers is the unionist ruling class in the North and the ‘Nationalist’ ruling class in the South. Before we actually deal with this argument lets just note the confusion and contradictions this view leads to.

The last sentence on the last page is supposed to drive home a central lesson which the book trys to make ‘,..we argue that only one class has an interest in ending the partition of Ireland: the working class.’ [Page 86].

But there is no reason given the previous analysis why the working class should have any interest in ending partition. Why should they targe the border? | Why shouldn’t Northern workers unite and fight their ruling class and Southern workers do the same and after they’ve both won maybe they can unite than?

If the South really is free from imperialism then a major plank of permanent revolution has been disproved, the capitalist class can achieve national liberation. There is no need for working class leadership.

Bambury complains that “It is no good appealing to Southern workers as fellow Irish men and women to rise up in support of their Northern brothers and sisters” [Page 8&4] but if they don’t suffer from the same enemy - British imperialism(even if in different ways) then he has really left He does say that they both suffer from capitalism but why should Dublin workers show a particular, immediate and direct intrest in uniting with those in Belfast and Derry than with those in London or Paris who also suffer from capitalism.

Let’s now have a look at the analysis which produces these mistakes: “‘The idea that the Northern troubles would automatically spill over was based on the belief that the South remained .

in essence a neo-colony of Britain, dominated not politically bu economically. But by the 1970's this was no longer true.

Irish government figures showed that by 1980 70% of new investment in the South was by American multi-.

nationals, 21% from European capital and a mere 4% from

Page 20 British firms - an accurate reflection of Britains decline as an industrial power. At the beginning of the 1970’s Britain provided 70% of the Souths imports. By the beginning of the 1980’s this had declined to 47%, In real terms the southern state of Ireland has separate economic intrests from those of its British neighbour. That was shown in 1982 when the Irish government publically broke with Britain, refusing to support the Falklands war with Argentina. Workers in the South do not today confront a state where Britain pulls the real strings of power. They do not confront British-owned firms in their” day-to day struggles over wages and jobs’’. [Page 79] First of all it should be explained that neo-colonialism means political domination as well as economic even though the former is less transparent and _ direct. This does not mean that Southern capitalists do not have their own interests which occasionally lead to clashes with the imperialist power. It does mean that the power behind these interests is weaker and that they are subordinated to those of the imperialist powere which in the end is their real guarantee of survival.

The nub of the argument is that even if Britain’s share of economic exploitatiom is declining it is historically the political powerover the country and is recognised as such.

Thus the increasing american interest in Ireland (evidenced by the money promised in the Anglo-Irish deal) is designed to put pressure on or alternatively to support British intervention - not to displace Britain. Britain remains the enemy because it is partition which is the political means which secures capitalist exploitation on both sides of the border. Any Irish revolution seeking to take over the multi-nationals will face the forces of the British state soon after confronting the 26-county one. Whether these multi-nationals are American German or Japaneese will make no difference. None of this means believing that the ‘Northern troubles will automatically spill over’ to the South.

This failure to understand the continuing domination of imperialism can lead to a whole series of errors in analysing Irish society and political forces.

Why is nationalism still so powerful an ideology? Banbury’s explanation is that it is taught in schools etc. Why is Fainna Fail by far and away the most popular party for Irish workers? Bambury explains it is because in the early 1930's it was for a while supported by the IRA, Labour party and Larkin. In fact the most important explanation for both is the continuing somination by imperialism.

However it is around three other areas which are dealt with at more length in the book that I will concentrate: the republican movement, the Protestant workers and the activity of Marxists. Bambury makes some valid and telling points in analysing the Republican movement. He points out that a struggle based only or even principally on the nationalist population of the North is impossible to win and that the Republicans have no real programme for extending it. He also rightly criticises that one Brighton bomb can somehow force the whole British ruling class backed by America to consider pulling out. Even with the addition of the electoral strategy the two combined is not a strategy which can deliver victory.

In general however because he denies the role of imperialism he underestimates the struggle which the republican movement has waged and the potential it unleashes. He quotes Eamon McCann approvingly: ‘“‘The primary reason why the Provisionals exist is that ‘socialism’ as we presented it was shown to be irrelevant.

The Provisionals are the inrush to fill the vacuum left by the absence of a_ socialist option’. [Page 63] Aside from the logical problem that sonething (The Provisionals) cannot be created by nothing (the absence of socialism) it rejects the.real positive reason for the birth and growth of militant republicanism. This is all the more confusing because on the opposite page Bambury does describe the real reason why the ‘Proves rose from the ashes’. They provided armed defence of nationalist workers and targeted the real enemy - the British army and the sectarian state.

Defining the growth of republicanism in a purely negative way; that their success is primarily socialism’s failure logically leads one to regret their existence. Instead socialists should regard positively the growth of a militant and uncompromising opposition to imperialism, whatever its limitations. In this book however there is no positive evaluation of the republican struggle and no perspective for socialists seeking united work with them.

The downgrading of imperialism facilitates a somewhat rosy view of the potential of Protestant and Catholic unity in the North. In the final chapter he goes so far.

as to say: “‘The real tragedy of Ireland is the failure to build a powerful socialist movement out of these struggles’. (Page 82) It is striking that the struggles he referes to are not those political ones marking the high points in the fight against imperialism but instances of Catholic/ Protestant unity or of social agitation. While undoubtedly it is vital for socialists to be involved and lead these struggles they should be in the direction of joining the key political struggle against imperialism. Downgrading this latter fight is a recipe for continuing the marginalisation of revolutionary socialism.

In this book the perspective of permanent revolution the working class leading the struggle against imperialism is once again denied. Bambury does make the point that it is precisely those reformist trade union and political leaders who have most often called for unity who have betrayed the struggles which created unity. Unfortunately he believes such unity can page 21 be cemented by making the final demand one for socialism.

There is no conception that it is precisely democratic demands such as positive discrimination in favour of employing Catholics which really do challenge bigotry ‘and sectarianism. No conception that part of the process of winning any significant number of Protestant workers is the demoralisation and destruction of Loyalism and the political and paramilitary organisations which organise it.

Chris Bambury is right that the crucial battle in the battle of ideas to win a majority of workers to socialism but he is wrong when he says that this will be achieved by centering on: “the daily struggle in the workplace, the daily struggle against the foreman, the boss and ultimately the employing class itself....”’ The battle to win the majority of workers to revolutionary socialism will be waged primarily in the fight against imperialism, against the state. Only in so far as the struggles he mentions do this do they become revolutionary.

It is because ideas are so important that Marxists must get them right. While making some valid points this book doesn’t do that. .

JOE CARTER.

IRELANDS PERMANENT REVOLUTION

by CHRIS BAMBURY

BOOKMARKS 1986 PRICE £2.50

Peoples Democracy

SOCIALIST EDUCATION MEETINGS

Peoples Democracy has opened part of its internal education system to debate key issues not only among ourselves, but with individual ‘militants involved in the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. The meetings take place on the first Saturday of each month in the Horizon Bookshop, Busy Bee, Andersonstown, Belfast from 11.00am untill 1.00pm.

4th October: Trade Unions - Why don’t they defend workers rights?

Trade Unions in the the North of Ireland are infamous for their failure to fight discrimination and Loyalist intimidation.

They claim to organise around ‘bread and butter’ unity, but even here they fail. Should revolutionaries be in this sort of movement can they change it? 1st November: The Armalite - does it really make us equal?

Justification for the armed struggle can be found simply by pointing to the armed might of the British forces deployed on our streets, but where does it fit into a strategy for victory? Does the present Republican strategy of ‘ Armalite and Ballot box’ strike the balance?

Or is another strategy possible?

Creche facilities available. Please give advance notice.

Feoples Democracy HORIZON BOOKSHOP wri Busy Bee Andersonstown, Belfast BT12. Tel: Belfast 617926. Busy Bee * * * Baile Anderson, Beal Feirste, BT12. Guthan: Béal Feirste 617926

page 22

SOUTH AFRICA

THE FORCES IN STRUGGLE

The following is an extract from the resolution ‘Black revolt in South Africa’ passed by a majority at the Febuary meeting of ‘the International Executive committee of the Fourth International. It concentrates on the liberation movement, particularly the ANC and COSATU, and on _ the ‘Freedom Charter’ advanced by the ANC and supported by: the UDF. This should not be confused with PD’s own call for a Freedom charter and a number of criticisms of the ANC programme are advanced in the resolution.

Nevertheless the role of the charter in South Africa and the lessons of the liberation struggle deserve wide discussion in Ireland and many of the problems facing the South African struggle also face revolutionaries in Ireland.

; The ANC is today the principle political organisation inside the national liberation movement. Its influence is particularly strong inside the African townships. It has considerable influence over the UDF as such and also over a large number of its member organisations. It is also seen by democratic white layers as the key organisation to relate to. The continued incarceration of leaders like Nelson Mandela symbolises in the eves of the masses the continuity and tenacity of a movement whose foundation goes back to 1912. This functions to give it a sort of legitimacy in the eves of broad sectors of the masses. .

Atthe beginning the ANC was set up as a nationalist, reformist grouping whose objectives were to put pressure on the regime in order to obtain real democratic rights for the Africans. After the Second World War a new generation of activists began to bring about a shift in the practice of the ANC. This radicalisation was due to several factors; the influence of liberation struggles throughout the world. the social evolution of South Africa which favoured new forms of struggle. the coming to power of the National Party and the installation of the apartheid system, contacts with the Communist Party and the possibility of benefiting from new nationalist developments in Black Africa. But up to the end of the 1950s the ANC saw itself as an African movement, remaining attached to its idea of a democratised South Africa, but ready to compromise on a federal-style organisation in function of the ‘existence’ of several ‘races’ or ‘nations’.

This was the thinking on the national question which lay behind the launching of the Congress of the People which ratified in 1955 the Freedom Charter. This Congress included the ANC, the South African Indian Congress. the Coloured People’s Congress. the Congress of Democrats and the SACTU trade union organisation. Throughout all this period the ANC maintained a vacillatory position between support for the mass movement and support for white liberals. It was the time when it was in favour of a great national negotiation bringing together the different peoples of South Africa. Many of its leaders still thought change could come peacefully. But continued developments and the internal debate meant things did not remain static. One of the ‘hot’ internal questions was around the question of the entry of whites into the ANC, which was also linked to relations with the Communist Party and the membership of certain of its cadres. These were the problems behind the split by the current refusing to break with the African nationalist tradition of the movement and the formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1958. In the same period the political situation began to deteriorate. The mass movement was seeking new forms of struggle but did not succeed in forcing the regime to retreat when it began setting up the apartheid regulations and repressive framework. After 1957 strikes declined both in number and in terms of workers’ involvement. The mass movement was divided. hardly politicised and little structured. In 1960 rallies took place in Sharpeville and Langa in response to calls made by the PAC. The rallies were organised to carry out mass burnings of the internal passports Blacks had to carry. The police fired on the masses and there were dozens of deaths. The ANC and the PAC were banned. The defeat was confirmed in 1963 with the arrest of key leaders.

The ANC then opted for the armed struggle. This choice was made not just as a result of a political change in line-due to the new relationship of force and the violence of the regime. The ANC also corrected its understanding of South African society and integrated foreign experiences, beginning with that of the Algerian revolution. The choice of armed struggle was also made in relation to the armed revolts that had occurred in the reserves -throughout the 1950s and up to 1963. The ANC consequently opted for what it called rural armed struggle—a line it seems to have stuck to up to the Soweto events of 1976. However South Africa was a country whose social and economic structures were changing rapidly and where the feasibility of effectively carrying out such a strategy was clearly seen to be more and more illusory. , But most of the ANC leadership was then in exile. a part in the African countries of the region to organise armed actions, and a part in Europe to set up an apparatus representing the ANC overseas. When the mass movement re-emerged in 1973 the ANC was to pay a price for its strategic eclec- ticism and its leadership weakness inside South Africa—it found itself marginalised from events. The political life of the movement only took place in exile and the armed struggle project was limited to armed propaganda.

although the latter had its uses. for the ANC still today maintains a certain credit in the eyes of the masses for such activity. Nevertheless this policy did not provide it with a line for intervening in the mass movement as it re-emerged. Moreover the ANC did not correct this line after the Durban strike in 1973 which pointed to a new era. It seemed to make the change.

and then with some delay. only after the Soweto struggles of 1976. The effects of the 1960-1963 defeat had only lasted a dozen years and the 1976 youth movement confirmed this. But once again another current than the ANC was to be prominent in these events—the Black consciousness movement championed by a new generation of activists.

The ANC was later to win a sector of these activists, particularly those who fled the country. without a political solution, and ended up in refugee camps in neighbouring countries where the ANC was influential and could offer the perspective of armed struggle. This was the period when the movement turned to spectacular actions in the urban areas with the specific hope of economically disrupting the country.

The ANC was to make up its lost ground by seeking to link up with the new wave of radicalisation after 1981. It was able to do this despite the, lack of a clear strategy during the whole previous period and despite being relatively outside of the recomposition going on inside the country, because it paid great attention to the questions or organisation and particularly” underground networks of activists and cadres. The ANC managed to educate certain of its activists who became capable of boldly and courageously taking considerable risks in underground work. It was right to want to use and capitalise on the radical democratic sentiments existing among a fringe layer of young whites, the petty-bourgeois origin of these people not being.

an obstacle preventing using this current and even winning a sector of it to the struggle. The ANC has also been able to take tactical initiatives and exploit certain openings, the main one being the launching of the UDF. At this stage of the struggle. when the mass movement has not worked out a whole series of tactical and organisational questions, the ANC has at least built up a solid influence among a majority of the civic associations.

The ANC’s strategic position is now that of a democratic revolution assuring the national liberation of the oppressed. Although it now insists on the particular role of the workers in this revolution it does not define precisely what the social content of this new state power should be. Given the influence of the ANC and its militants this does have some consequences on the actions and forms or organisation adopted today in the mass movement.

It can also have an effect on how the UDF approaches its relations with the liberals. The ANC has gradually modified its line over the last years. It seems to have abandoned the pluri-national conception of the democratic struggle. The emergence of independent trade unions declaring their non-racial character (i.e. in other terms than multi-racial) has been a factor in this change. The ANC has also said along the same lines that it was no longer a supporter of a national convention, implying a federalist solution.

For several months it has chosen to demonstrate more clearly than previously its relations with the CP. Its press has brought out the programmatic similarities with the CP. Elections to the Executive Committee of the ANC at its June 1985 congress confirmed this with the official integration of well-known CP leaders. For 25 years relations with the CP have been an important political problem inside the ANC. The PAC split was partially linked to that. The setting up of the military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation), enabled the CP to reinforce its collaboration and influence. The period around the Morogoro conference of 1969, the last congress before the 1985 one, was also an occasion for this debate.

The ANC has always denounced the amalgam made between itself and the CP since the Pretoria regime uses this argument to justify repression. But recently the ANC’s press has begun to praise the CP as the party of the working class and has published articles signed by well known leaders of the CP. The SACP is systematically presented as the permanent ally of the movement. The Communist Party press openly displays its relationship to the ANC. The CP. whose leadership is also in exile, held its 6th Congress ‘white’ area. Locked up for being black in a page 23 some weeks before that of the ANC and confirmed in its new platform that it aimed *. . . to participate in and strengthen the liberation alliance of all classes and strata whose interests are served by immediate aims of the national democratic revolution. This alliance is expressed through the liberation front headed by the African National Congress’.

The Communist Party, which presents itself as the expression of the proletarian vanguard, defends the idea of revolution directly derived from Stalinist tradition. Its press continually denounces what it calls the ultraleftists, the ‘new South African Marxists’ and certain trade union leaders who do not identify with the ANC. The CP at one and the same time has an exaggeratedly optimistic analysis of the situation, sectarian attitudes to other currents and a mechanical splitting up of the revolutionary process, it states for example: . . . It is from the depth of their tragedy and suffering that the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa, white as well as Black, now look to the Freedom Charter for inspiration in their struggle to escape from the nightmare of their present existence. True, there may be some opponents of the regime who still fight for the Charter because they are reluctant to identify themselves with the ANC or the SACP whom they regard as its authors and principal sponsors. Nevertheless, outside the ranks of racists and a handful of the ultra-leftists, few can be found to repudiate any of the ‘asic principles expounded in the Charter, which today unites Congressists and non-Congressists. Communists and non- Communists, freed6m fighters and pacifists, in a broad front pledged to overturn apartheid and complete the first stage of the national democratic revolution.

At the present time the ANC combines its nationalist tradition with a strategic conception derived from the Communist Party. This synthesis has greatly helped the ANC evolve over the last twenty years. It brought it to a new analysis of society and classes in South Africa. The ability to build an apparatus, to form a tight network of international support, to tactically | manoeuvre in a way the ANC never could have, is due to the relations developed with the SACP. All this gave it a capacity to intervene enabling it to partially capitalise on movements which it did not instigate. The symbolic use of Mandela and of the Freedom Charter allows it to put itself forward pedagogically to the masses as the natural and logical political outcome to their mobilisations. The Freedom Charter is used as an elementary democratic programme. Written in 1954 the Charter, even interpreted as a simple platform of agitation, is marked by the social situation of that period and the positions the ANC then had on the national question. It was the product of a given historical conjuncture. Furthermore the Charter's formulation on the nationalisation of the monopolies could prove to be contradictory with a line of compromise with the white opposition. All these problems are reflected in the way the ANC uses the Charter. Sometimes it is presented as the present programme both of the struggle and as the finished expression of the national democratic revolution. On other occasions it is used as a symbol, a rallying point aiming to recall the historic continuity of the ANC and its project of a broad front, from the 1955 Congress of the People up to the UDF today.

One of the main problems facing the ANC leadership today is the trade union movement and COSATU. The Chartist current was shown to be weak and in a minority during the four-year long debate on the trade union unification. This confirmed the delay taken by this current to come to terms with.

the changes in South African society, but also the fact that in the mass political movement there is a several-decades-old debate on questions as, important as the role of the working class, the social objectives of the liberation struggle, class alliances and mass democracy.

The liberals have started to openly organise discussion between the white opposition and the ANC. On September 13 1985 a delegation of businessmen went to Zambia to meet the ANC leadership. It was made up of representatives of the main capitalist groups and institutions in the country. On October 12 it was the turn of the PFP leadership to go to Zambia to meet the ANC. Since then the Methodist Churches and the Afrikaner student circles have made the trip. The protagonists have all publicly recognised that the .

discussions dealt with the ANC’s project for society, the way to dismantle apartheid and on the liberal project of a ‘national convention’. No agreement has been mentioned but all parties have insisted that it is absolutely necessary to integrate the ANC into any negotiating, process. A certain number of declarations, indeed actions, regularly made by them show that the bourgeois opposition is seriously intending to go down that road. By calling now on the regime to negotiate with Black leaders, beginning with’ the ANC, the liberals are looking for a third way out of the present crisis of South African society. But the contradictions are such that this solution would mean a leadership like the ANC willing to commit itself to limiting the mass movement and bringing it to a moderate approach in a lasting way.

For the time being it has used the Zambian discussions to project itself as the main interlocutor both nationally and internationally. It rejected the proposal of a ‘national convention’ which had been one of its demands in the 1950s. ;

page 24 Nelson Mandela Ces. 3 It is far too soon to evaluate the possibilities of some sort of agreement between these parties. Its contacts with the liberals do not date from yesterday and the rise of the mass movement works in its favour in the present discussions. At this stage of the discussions:the Black masses see relations with the liberals as a tactical necessity accentuating the isolation of Botha, deepening the government crisis and holding back the repressive capacity of the regime. These discussions cannot be condemned as such, even if it is legitimate that there is debate in the mass movemenmt on the long term objectives of such discussions. It is correct to use divisions inside the ruling class. It is possible to draw an advantage from the crisis of bourgeois leadership but that must not be done by mortgaging the independence of the popular movement and its revolutionary dynamic. It is certain that any progress in the ‘semi-official’ negotiations or discussions will speed up political and strategic debate inside the oppressed people’s movement. If it was no longer simply a case of tacitly using divisions inside the ruling class but of negotiating. the debate would consequently focus on the question of compromise. In that instance the whole of the perspectives of the South African revolution and needs of the masses would be discussed with respect to the ANC’s policies.

Once these discussions between the liberals and the ANC were made public the latter raised among its prime demands the lifting of its own banning. It is trying to push home as far as possible the advantages it has gained through these meetings. If big capital and the liberals want to consider it as their main interlocutor, as the necessary intermediary between . themselves and the mass movement, then in exchange the ANC is demanding legality. If such an event did take place as a result of a government crisis and a political reshuffle at the summit of the state, it is certain that the ANC would become a party with massive organised support and a new political situation would open up. While the ANC occasionally presents itself as a’ broad national front where everybody can find their place, other political forces on the contrary see it as a well defined political current, particularly so given its links with the Communist Party. But the legalisation of the ANC or, even short of that, the extension of its real representation in the popular movement, would accentuate its difficulty of wanting to be at one and the same time a national mass movement and a very ideologically defined political current. If the ANC could under one form or another legally or semi-legally operate .inside the country it would mean that the general conditions for political action would have profoundly changed. All political forces would then have the possibility of publicly existing and defending their positions. Such conditions would also therefore raise the possibility of a political organisation _ expressing the interests of the working class, that is, a workers’ party.

kKkekkkke Other political currents apart from the ANC are today struggling in South Africa. The best known of these is the Black Consciousness current which emerged at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, This current was prominent in the youth mobilisations of the Transvaal in 1976. But it rapidly fragmented afterwards. Its nationalist ideology fostered certain sectarian attitudes which has added to its organisational difficulties.

All the same, a sector of this current built or influenced the growth of an important wing of the independent trade union movement (CUSA and AZACTU). It was this trade union sector, with the exception of the miners union, the NUM, which has refused for the moment to join COSATU on the pretext of the presence of white activists in its leadership. If this position is not changed the two trade unions could find themselves marginalised in the future and even facing a serious crisis. The forces that have come out of it today range from rather rightist Black nationalist positions to currents which have gradually taken a Marxist approach to society. One sector now defines the Black proletariat as the social vanguard of the popular movement and says it is in favour of a Black workers’ party.

The Azanian National People’s Organisation (AZAPO) also reflects this evolution. But it is still heterogeneous. However it is the only organisation with a national implantation which is not attached to the Chartist current.- AZAPO is facing problems of political line such as the united front tactic, unitary relations with UDF organisations and the analysis of non-racial trade unionism. Its ambiguous position at the time of the Transvaal strike in November 1984 revealed these political difficulties. As one of the key members of the National Forum AZAPO sought to set up an alternative pole to the Chartist current. But this aim has not been achieved.

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) no longer seems to have any real, centralised forces inside South Africa. This does not rule out the possibility of some activists intervening in other movements still identifying with this current. The PAC has kept up a small network outside the country allowing it to intervene occasionally in the solidarity movement.

On the other hand there is a certain number of organisations, associations, and groupings which aim to develop another line from that of the - ANC and the Black Consciousness current through propaganda on the role of the working class vanguard, the socialist perspective and the rejection of alliances with the liberal bourgeois current. Certain of these groups, from a long way back, have defended the position of ‘non-racialism’, calling traditionally for a struggle for a single nation as opposed to the previous plurinational ANC position. This current is however very weak and dispersed, often reduced to propagandistic and ideological activity. Among its best known organisations are the Cape Action League (member of the National Forum) and the New Unity Movement. In 1983 a sector of these organisations tried to set up a broad united front against the constitutional reform projects of the regime. That was how the Disorderly Bill Action Committee of the Cape (DBAC) was born. But friction grew very quickly with the Chartist organisations over the functioning of the DBAC and the alliances question and it led to a break-up of the committee.

This current is today facing two main problems which limit its impact: on the one hand its divisions which means it has to unify its forces if its resources and audience are to grow and on the other hand, the need to work out more precisely a concrete line of intervention and not limit itself to defending ‘principled’ positions. To achieve this it will have to take up tactical and agitational questions with much more flexibility and subtlety in the mass ‘movement. Its criticism of the UDF for instance mainly focused on the alliance with the liberals. However the masses learn first of all through their own daily experiences and this denunciation of the UDF cannot be. really grasped at that level. An organisation can only win a certain credibility in the movement through its own ability to take initiatives and carry out activist interventions. Despite ts difficulties this current benefits for the moment from the existence in the trade union movement of certain leaderships which have asserted their independence from the UDF and Chartism. The high degree of organisation of these trade unions and their objective weight legitimises radical positions on the role of the working class. But that cannot be eternally used as a justification and counterweight to the influence of the UDF and the ANC. This current cannot develop its influence only by counting on its programmatic profile. On the basis of its own ability to take initiatives and to actively intervene it could develop a dialogue with other forces on Strategic questions placed on the agenda by the powerful upsurge of the mass movement and the emergence of the trade union movement.

One of the most striking events of the last years has been the development of the independent trade unions and the setting up on November 30 1985 of a united confederation regrouping a number of them. Despite the fact that a sector of trade unions close to the Black Consciousness theses refused to join COSATU, it represents a considerable step forward for the working class and an important victory for all the oppressed of the country. This stage was not reached without going through great adversity. A great number of trade unionists paid with their lives in this effort to build a real organisation for Black workers. The development of the miners’ union (NUM) in 1984 was a very important event encouraging moves towards the unity of different dispersed sectors of the South African working class.

This advance of class trade unionism also facilitated political reflection and debates on the demands and objectives of trade union struggle. The resolutions from the founding congress of COSATU reflect this gain, some of which are openly anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, particularly when they deal with denouncing the multinationals.

page 25 Independent and non-racial trade unionism, which has unified in COSATU. developed on the basis of the economic evaluation of the country and the growth of the Black proletariat in big industry which opened the way to the emergence of a new generation of worker activists.

After the 1960-63 defeat of the Black masses, South Africa went through considerable industrial growth. Both the re-investment of profits made by the big mining companies and the massive inflow of imperialist capital played a part in this. The return of some South African capital which had been placed abroad during the previous period of recession also contributed. This industrial growth benefited from state incentives and the setting up of a local financial market. South African industry had become the main component of GNP in 1946, but it was necessary to wait until the 1970s for the country to become an industrialised country properly speaking. In the 1950s the majority of companies were small. In 1954 for instance 65% of workplaces only employed nine workers and 92% less than 49.

Nevertheless this has all produced a Black working class which, while not necessarily concentrated in big workplaces, is grouped in huge ghettos within the four or five main industrial zones of the country. For all this period the bosses needed to stabilise this labour and give it some training.

A sector of the employers went around the laws and sought to hire a layer of semi-skilled Black workers. That favoured stable employment and residence for a substantial layer af workers in Spite of the migrant labour Status imposed on Black workers. There are now ten million Blacks living in urban areas outside the Bantustans. At the same time the Indian and Col.

oured working class grew, bringing about the coming together on the factory floor of communities kept apart in all other domains of society.

From 1960 to 1970 the number of wage earners in manufacturing industry increased by 65%, going up from 658,026 workers to 1,070,033. The volume of production increased on average by 8.4% between 1963 and 1968.

Private industry alone increased its production by 157.6% during the 1960s.

Manufacturing and the construction industry’s proportion of GNP was 28.2% in 1970 compared to 10.5% for the mining sector. Reflecting the extension of the proletariat, the proportion of women in the working class increased throughout the last twenty years. From 1973 to 1981 the percentage of women workers in the Black working class went up by 23.9% in the shoe industry, 15.2% in commerce and 12% in the textile industry.

This social development was also reflected in socio-economic movements from as early as 1972. But it was above all the Natal strikes of 1973 which Anti-apartheid march by supporters of mass-based United Democratic Front.

S din sajyonbs uwtosf uaspfiy) 3 < a) a \o 12 13 13 NS c > 7 marked the turning point in the development of a new workers’ movement.

Official statistics show a leap from 71 strikes in 1972 involving 8,814 workers to 370 strikes with 98,029 workers involved in 1973. These struggles were essentially about wage increases but they clearly expressed the emergence of a new form of social challenge to apartheid, some sectors demanding increases varying from 50% to 300%. In 1969 there were only 13 African trade unions with not more than 16,000 members. After 1973 a new type of trade unionism was born—in particular out of the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC). These trade unions were built outside TUCSA, a corporatist federation controlled by white trade unions. Along with the creation of other unions around this time the Federation of. South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was formed as a national federation in 1979 organising single trade unions for each industry. At the same time a certain number of what were called ‘general trade unions’ like the Western Province General Workers’ Union (the future GWU) or the South African Allied Workers’ Union (SAAWU) were formed.

During this period the number of trade unionists in these independent trade unions went up from 70,000 in 1979 to 200,000 in 1982 and to more than 400,000 in 1983. The number of Black workers in trade unions, including in the TUCSA trade unions, due to their recognition and closedshop system. rose from 223.661 in 1980 tc 741,194 in 1983.

Black workers’ industrial struggles, which went into a lull after 1973-74, took off again at the end of the 1970s. From 90 disputes in 1977 involving 15.09] strikers there was a rise to 394 disputes with 141,571 strikers in 1982. In 1984. according to official figures there were 469 strikes mobilising 181.942 workers of whom 174,897 were Africans. The number of strikedays lost were 379.712 and the disputes were mainly about wages, union recognition and redundancies. Finally. the new trade unions proved their influence and growing implantation in these movements.

The new laws that came out of the Wichahn Commission (1979 to 1981) tried to modify the labour market a little while at the same time trying to limit the growth of the new trade unions. They ended up providing a new space for the existence and then the legal recogniion of non-racial unions.

It had been possible because leaderships within this movement knew how to use the different policies of the regime and of the bosses (particularly the multinationals). The concern of certain trade Unions to build up first of all at factory level, at the base of the working class, and to stabilise their existence through partial struggles which were often victorious, represented a very constructive approach. Non-racial trade unionism was thus abic to impose itself on the situation even against the tribunals.

However these tactical questions divided the trade union movement when discussions about unification got off the ground. While all the independent trade unions denounced the existing regulations, some accepted to be registered officially and to sit in the industrial councils for tactical reasons.

The other trade unions denounced this practice as being more or less collaborationist. It was generally the trade unions which were members of FOSATU and the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) which adopted the first position. The second position was supported at the beginning by certain trade unions that had come out of the Black Consciousness tradition, the Chartist influenced unions and some others like the GWU.- Another discussion related to the type of trade unions to build, that is.

whether to build up trade unions divided in industrial sectors or general unions. The distinct options naturally led to different ways of structuring the base of the unions. Some unions justified the general union option by the need to intervene in the communities. In practice this question combined two problems: how the trade unions were to intervene in the political mass movement and then the problem of the less stable Black labour, the “commuters” (migrants having to return each day or frequently to their Bantustan) often having precarious employment particularly in the service sector. A trade union like SAAWU tried to prioritise this type of trade unionism by building itself as a general union, intervening in the communities, joining the UDF and trying to mobilise the workers from the Ciskei Bantustan.

SAAWU had great difficulties resulting from its very weak intervention in the workplaces and the repression that the white regime and the Ciskei administration meted out fo it.

The third great debate produced differences between those who wanted non-racial trade unionism and those who called for Black trade unionism, thus prohibiting whites from taking leading positions. The latter position is still held today by CUSA and AZACTU which have refused to join COSATU and retain their faith in ‘Black consciousness’ ideology.

In all these discussions, where the trade unions lined up in different groups, FOSATU emerged as the organisation in relation to which the other organisations took positions. It was FOSATU and some other trade unions (General Workers Union, Food and Canning Workers Union, Cape Town Municipal Workers Association, joined in the end by the National Union of Mineworkers) which played a major role in the unification talks.

FOSATU held this role as a result of its real influence in struggles. In 1982 FOSATU trade unions led 103 disputes involving 87,226 strikers. In the same year for instance another federation, CUSA, led 10 strikes involving 3,675 workers and the SAAWU six strikes with 2.671 workers.

These problems of orientation led up in 1983 to the question of the affiliation of the trade unions to the political fronts, to the UDF or to the National Forum. The main trade unions decided against affiliating to either front. Contrary to the criticism of them by those trade unions who had affiliated to the UDF the problem was never that of denying the necessity for the trade union movement to get involved in the general political struggle. The problem was, and remains, the pace and form this political activity of the trade union movement should take given its recent formation and lack of consolidation. Also each of the unions were being obliged to place themselves in relation to the political currents which are the prime movers behind these fronts. The question of workers’ democracy at the base. the specific representation of the trade unions or of relations with the liberals (who are occasionally the bosses of trade unionists) are logically connected to this political debate. It is highly significant that the trade unions which played the central role in the process of unification are precisely the ones which refused to affiliate to the UDF or the National Forum. So two sets of ideas about building the workers’ movement were more or less explicit- !y counterposed during this period. In 1982 the general secretary of the FOSATU, Joe Foster, emphasised the ‘need for a working class movement’ pointing out that workers ‘must strive to build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part of a wider popular struggle’.

This was indeed opposed to the line proposed by trade unions which affiliated to the UDF, for example by Sidney Mufamadi, from the GAWU, who declared: ‘Some want to perceive the working class as only found on the factory floor. Our view is that even those people who are not behind machines . . . can be said to be waging a working class struggle if the issues they take up in their various sites of struggle . . . serve to undermine the class relations upon which the present society is built’.

This debate reflects the contradictions in the mass movement today.

A large sector of the population socially marginalised in the Bantustans, townships and poor neighbourhoods can only organise through the civic associations. Another sector of the Black population, a minority, but nevertheless comprising several million people who have a more or less stable job in industry, the mines or in certain service industries, find a new form of organisation in the trade union movement. The relationship between these two complementary forms of organisation cannot be simply established in terms of their respective numerical representation. Certainly there is the question of the unity in general of all the mass organisations which the UDF and the National Forum have tried to respond to. But there is also the question of the weight the working class should have in a movement that is highly heterogeneous from the point of view of its experiences of struggle, its forms of organisation and occasionally its social composition. This provides the basis for political and organisational differentiations. While everybody agrees that the unity of this immense movement must be improved and guaranteed, big differences subsist over the content of this unity, notably with regard to the role the newly emerged workers’ movement should have as well as the rhythm of development and form its independent political expression should take. This is the debate that has separated a certain number of trade union leaderships over the past few years from the Chartist current. Whereas the former want to assert the autonomy of their projects, the latter have tried to set themselves up as an alternative leadership in the trade union movement: @ the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), an organisation in exile linked to the ANC, falsely claimed that it was a sort of ‘underground trade union centre’, more or less presiding over unfolding developments in the trade union movement, calling on the latter to rally behind the ANC banner.

@ the Communist Party violently attacked the FOSATU leadership, sometimes criticising it for not recognising the CP’s role as the proletarian vanguard and for wanting to replace the CP in that position and sometimes reproaching it for reducing the struggle to economism. In 1979 at a decisive moment for trade union development the party’s central committee declared that it wanted to primarily encourage Black unions which had refused to register. @ the Chartist current inside the trade unions, particularly SAAWU, took a rigid position against registration and participation in the Industrial Councils. It also denounced what it concluded was a refusal to intervene on the political terrain when the most important trade unions refused to affiliate to the UDF. There is no doubt that in this discussion the Chartist current put forward sectarian positions for a period. Reality has been the test: the line it denounced did not lead to betrayal or integration. The criticised trade unions perhaps have not solved all their problems, but they have established solid structures. Finally the moves to trade union unity have been primarily their responsibilty. Once the process towards the founding of a united trade union confederation was confirmed the Chartist current gradua'ly rectified their line. But other problems came up: whereas outside the country SACTU said it supported one union per industry, inside the country organisations like SAAWU seemed to delay a great deal their transformation from a page 27 general union to industrial unions which resulted in them being considered for a period as ‘observers’ by the union most involved in the unification process. But on the other side of the coin, those ‘unitary trade unions’, as they have been dubbed, which are seeking to project themselves as a specific and independent force, must overcome an important problem, that of intervening outside the workplaces, in the neighbourhoods and the townships.

Since they want to put themselves forward as a proletarian pole they must not merely stabilise trade union organisation in the factories. They need to extend their field of intervention gradually to other mass sectors. There has been a considerable de-synchronisation between the level of implementation of the first task compared to the second. The active propaganda undertaken by certain trade unions in favour of the boycott of the ‘Indian’ and ‘Coloured’ elections in 1984, their decisive presence in the Transvaal general strike in November 1984 and then in the organisation of certain consumer boycotts of white businesses, has paved the way for the first significant presence of these organisations on this terrain. But it is probable that the ground to be made up is still significant.

The question of the unemployed—the mass of the marginalised population—is also an important question for the trade union movement.

The COSATU congress decided to undertake an organisation of these workers. Any progress in this direction will open up an intervention and organising activity by the trade unions in the residential areas. The question of the trade unionisation of the unemployed is therefore connected to the problem of the autonomous political expression of the trade unions in the townships and communities. All these problems will now be debated inside COSATU. The new confederation will have internal discussions of decisive importance for the future of the struggle of the South African oppressed and for the future of this working class. At a time when there is so much talk of ‘reforms’ and where the bosses of the biggest companies speak of ‘democracy’ it is vital that the industrial working class can intervene in an independent way and impose its own demands.

The new level of struggles raises new problems. In the present phase the question of convergence between the mass mobilisations (school boycotts, boycotts of white businesses, boycotts of transport) and the organ- ised movement of the working class is urgently posed. Without such convergence difficulties will arise as during the 1985 boycott movements. This question can begin to be resolved thanks to the foundation of COSATU. But the trade unions on their own cannot solve all these problems. Up to the founding of the unitary confederation each trade union or federation was built on a precise line and project. Today every worker, or nearly every worker, is in COSATU, which changes the form of the debate about orientation which is going to continue.

The second problem is mass self-defence and initiatives taken on this ter- Tain so that a new offensive can develop. Up to the present there has been little or no response at this level. Probably the ANC is looking for an eventual answer to this problem, but the armed propaganda that it has carried out up to now will not provide a solution. Eurthermore in South Africa it is not possible to count on a process of disintegration inside the army.

There is no short term answer to this question but any organisation aspiring to lead the revolutionary process must begin to go forward in this field.

All the main important political and organisational questions are dependent on the strategic objectives one sets for the South African revolution.

To be more precise. the dynamic and content of the various democratic and national demands depends on the class character of the state which emerges from the overthrow of the apartheid regime and which will begin to respond to them. Depending on whether one fixes as an objective a “democratic state’ that is not defined socially or a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, all the problems are not dealt with in the same way.

The need for a proletarian leadership flows logically from our analysis of the South African revolutionary process. The existence of such a leadership is not assessed only by the degree of contro! such an organisation has over the mass movement, but is also gauged by its programme and its practice. The struggle for the effective accomplishment of the democratic tasks in any case requires that the working class is placed at the centre of the mobilisations. However, this objective is still far from being reached today in South Africa. Strengthening the workers’ movement and forming a recognised working class leadership are tasks that are necessary to prevent the present struggles ending in a dead-end, without even being able to resolve the main democratic demands.

Nobody today, apart from the Communist Party, claims to be this leadership. The ANC presents itself as the leadership of the national liberation movement grouping all classes, but in no way as a revolutionary workers’ party—a role it implicitly leaves to the CP.

page 28 It is scarcely possible to envisage the revolutionary victory of the masses with such a de-synchronisation between the rise of the mass struggle and the building of the revolutionary party—unless one believes in a democratic revolution without the organised hegemony of the working masses. On the other hand it would be wrong to deduce that the South African social formation produces a sort of spontaneous. automatic popular hegemony without a leadership intervening with its programme and action to organise and defend it. The question of the workers’ party has been taken up in relation to the trade union question. Joe Foster, general secretary of FOSATU, had evoked the necessity of such a party in 1981. His speech sparked off significant speculation about the real possibility of a workers’ party emerging based on the trade union movement. Joe Foster’s references to an eventual “workers” party’ earned him very sharp attacks from the Communist Party. However. since this date nobody has given a more precise, concrete position on the possibility floated by the trade union leader. Obviously it is not a simple problem given the influence of the ANC on one side and heterogeneity of the trade union movement on the other. The growth of a workers’ party based on the trade unions would be very likely in present circumstances to bring repression down against the trade unions—which raises the important probiem of the defence of the gains represented by the trade unions. The potential emergence of a party on the basis of the gains of the trade unions would in any event depend on a combination of diverse initiatives both inside the trade union movement itself, on its periphery and in the political movement. Through unitary collaboration in practice and common political reflection, a convergence of perspective and mutual confidence between activists intervening on diferent fronts, but ready to build a common political organisation, could develop over the long term. But this necessary convergence on such an ambitious project could only be achieved by starting from the mass base already acquired in the trade unions.

It is imposible to say precisely today what is the way forward for the building of a working class and revolutionary political leadership or when ~~ sQX Brae AREA Etienne veel ees ‘ ‘ ¢ 4 ié 4 4 4 "2 ‘% and how long this will take. We cannot forecast the internal political recompositions of the mass movement that achieving such an objective will require. However it appears that the political debates and conflicts involved in the contest for hegemony over the mass movement are underway. The development of the ANC on the one hand and the formation of COSATU on the other are elements in this process.

The upsurge of popular mobilisations in South Africa and the repressive response of the white regime requires the broadest possible support and active solidarity throughout the country. The Fourth International calls on all its sections to give great priority to this work, helping to organise huge unitary actions against the South African racist regime, for the release of Nelson Mandela and all the political and trade union prisoners and against the complicity of imperialist governments and multinationals with the apartheid regime.

Certain imperialist governments and a sector of companies operating in South Africa have taken wide-ranging measures of economic and political pressure against the South African government. Their respective motives are different but they all concur in seeking a negotiated solution which avoids a revolutionary crisis and maintains a favourable framework in the future for the durability of imperialist interests in this country.

American institutions have withdrawn more than $5 billion from companies with interests in South Africa. In 1985 at least twenty American companies stopped or slowed down their economic activity in this country.

Twelve states, 39 towns and 67 universities have sold $5.4 billion worth of shares held by companies operating in South Africa. According to the Department of Commerce direct American investment fell from $2.6 billion in 1981 to $1.8 billion in 1984. South African policy in Namibia is no longer credible for these circles. Military operations in Angola, including the

page 29 sabotage of an oil well belonging to the American Gulf Oil company, upsets them. Systematic repression of demonstrations worries them because they see it as proof of the lack of any alternative policy. Throughout 1985 the crisis of confidence in Botha’s government has worsened. A sector of the American ruling class no longer believes in Ronald Reagan’s policy of *constructive engagement’ which consisted in unfailingly supporting the Pretoria regime in the name of the global interesis ur the Ur. :ted States. Indeed, the present crisis confirms that American aid ana support have been no help in avoiding the crisis of the regime, even if this favoured the military and diplomatic operations in the rest of Southern Africa. The reform policy Reagan promised in exchange for this support has proved to be a farce.

The capitalist lobbies which want to go further in structural reforms in South Africa do not just take into account the social risks. They also think the ume has come to permanently change the South African economic system based on apartheid laws. It is the combination of these economic and political criteria which make these capitalist circles take a line today which is so much harder than in the past. The greatest attention must be paid to this development tor, far from absolving these forces from their previous praclice it represents a new arm in imperialism’s arsenal to push the Black movement along moderate lines. to trap and weaken it.

The British government criticises the South African government in the sume formal way as Reagan but nevertheless is also seeking to encourage a process of negotiation by discreetly supporting an ‘eminent persons group” whose aim is said to be to favour contacts between the ANC and the Botha regime. Al these manoeuvres must not get in the way of real, active solidarity.

Calls to break all links with the South African government, opposing Kruggerrand sales and boycotting all sporting links with South Africa have to be systematically taken up. The demand for an economic boycott of South Africa is a central focus of solidarity. principally in the imperialist countries. The arguments according to which Black workers are supposed to sutfer from such a boycott do not hold water. All the South African organisa- Uons have themselves rejected this explanation and want the stepping up of such measures against South Africa. The campaign for total sanctions or boycott must be used to show the complicity or passivity of governments to the racist regime and to highlight the importance of imperialist interests in this country. This activity against the regime must also be a means of developing concrete solidarity of the workers and anti-imperialist movements in support of the organisations struggling in South Africa. Organising direct links and supporting civic associations in struggle, should be the natural complement of protest campaigns against the regime.

In African countries, where the South African situation has a particular impact. it is necessary to highlight the passivity of governments which more often than not limit themselves to mere anti-apartheid rhetoric but without bringing any real aid to the Black movement. When there exists in these countries the beginnings of an independent solidarity movement it is necessary to popularise the forms of struggle and the courage of the South African oppressed masses. Since COSATU has said it is in favour of links with independent African trade unions initiatives should be taken building up such links in countries where such unions exist.

The aim of solidarity is to increase the active involvement of youth and workers’ movement in solidarity with the South African oppressed.

The South African mass movement is going through internal differentiations on the political, trade union and civic association levels. The press of the International should report this diversity. In a country where the masses are struggling against racist barbarism and are demanding above all basic democratic rights it is not the business of solidarity organisations to make some sort of selection among South African organisations and activists and designate those to whom support must be given as a priority.

In present conditions no political conditions justify acting in this way. The struggle in this country will be a long one. It will be very complex. Solidarity must be given to all components of the movement without sectarianism or exclusion. It must be given to COSATU, the ANC and all the social and political forces struggling against apartheid.

Our members should defend this approach in the solidarity campaigns or committees where they are active. Our sections intervene with a position of solidarity with all independent and non-racial organisations representing a sector of the oppressed who are fighting apartheid. Our organisations propose that this approach to solidarity be taken up and asserted when mass actions are organised.

In certain countries like the United States or Great Britain the antiapartheid solidarity campaigns mobilise a large number of Black workers and Black youth. This must be a way for our sections to link up with these sectors of the masses. We also try and get working class organisations to send delegations of inquiry and solidarity to South Africa. In the workplaces we call on the trade unions to participate in the permanent solidarity structures. We aim to get them to take up specific tasks of solidarity with the independent South African trade unions both on a national level as well as in each industry or multinational (especially the ones operating in South Africa). Appropriate trade union aid, popularising strikes, distributing the trade union press and ongoing links should be organised, not only to help the South African trade unions but also to bring the solidarity movement into the heart of the workplaces. International

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