Prisoners of Partition

Prisoners of Partition

H- PLOCKARMALA

A PEOPLES DEMOCRACY

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PRISONERS OF

PARTITION

Why should the [trish people support the political prisoners? The answer is quite straightforward. It is because Britain is subjecting them to an unbelevable level of oppression and suffering with one simple aim - to humiliate them and make them bend the knee to imperialism. ‘Phats grounds cnough - it’s grounds cnough for many people to offer support to political prisoners in other countries and it should be cnough reason to support Irish political prisoners.

If this is not sufficient for some people then simple self-interest should mobilise them. Britain’s time, effort and determination over a 4-year period has not gone to the achievement of an isolated victory ever the prisoners. They aim to humiliate the frish people asa whole and to defeat the popular sentiment against their presence in Ireland. For Northern Catholics it would mean not the “rule of law? but the establishment of two laws - one for anliimperialists and another for Paisley and U.D.A. killers. The lustory of the past decade should show the whole Irish people that a British victory could mean only more violence and repression and that this country’s domination by imperialism offers only a Future of cconomic exploitation and destitution tor all Trish workers.

The British will not be shifted from their course simply by a gencral sympathy. ‘Po achieve this we need mass organisation and mass action, The long history of support for the prisoners by the Relatives Action Committees in the North had led to (he National Smash H-Block/ Armagh campaign and a broadening of the campaign throughout all 32 counties. This campaign durtng the hunper strike achieved a mass mobilisation and unity of militants throughout the country and broupht the issue of the prisoners into many new areas: The Trade Unions, Students and Youth, Phe Womens movernent and many areas of international support.

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This was enough to force some concessions [rom the British hut not enough to bring about their uaplementation without further attempts to humiliate the prisoners. The demobilisation of the campaign inimediately afler the ending of the hunger strike means that we are now lacing a serious setback. All those who support the prisoners now need to mobilise behind the Smash TH-Block/ ’ Armagh campaizn aud organise within it fo discuss a new stratupy OF mass action that will place overwhelming pressure on the British , and easure victory tor the prisoners. If we are to do this we need some realistic assessment of the history of the prisoners strugele and of the balance of forces at the moment, The purpose of this pan: phlet is to provide that and develop the main clements of such a strategy a “as

ONLY ONE CONCLUSION

- BRITAIN IS PO BLAME

bor the past ten years Britain bas clatmed to be "keeping the peace’ inthe North. Internment and "Bloody Sunday? ovade Cs a pretty ludicrous chim but Ue British have stuck to tt. Yet in 1976 they launched an attack on the Political prisoners - an attack that has caused endless suffering to the prisoners, fucled a continuing strugete outside the prison and fed to the murder of H-Block/Armaglt actists by paramilitary Loyalist supporters of the British. Mor tive years the British have rejected not only political status but also the possibility oF any comprornise with Che prisonees. Despite all this top clerics and Nationalist politicians have called on the prisoners to moderate (heir stance and their demands. Our answer is that it is the British who arc to blame and it is they who must be forced to give way. 1 Anyone found guilty under the Narth’s speciatlaws of offences , committed before March £976 was granted “special eatapory status’, A British declaration was supposed fo transform those convicted after that date into criminals whose acts bad no political significance.

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Inacrude attempt af bribery the British offered a special remission rate of hall the scutence lo those whe conformed (do offset this they later doubled the length of sentence tor “Special Catagory? offences).

When the prisoners refused to be bribed the British tried brutality.

When Kieran Nugent refused to wear prison garb he was forcibly stripped and lettin a punishment cell with only a blanket as covering.

Por five years the men in Long Kesh have been “on the bhinket’.

They and the Annagh women have been isolated and subjected to harrassment and beatings. Chey have had their sentences cltectively doubled by their refusal to contorm. More recently the beatings and harrassment that occurred every thne prisoners lelt their cells forced a dirty protest, where prisoners are kept continuously locked up in cells covered wilh their own urine and excrement.

‘This oppression reached its height with a hunger strike that brought seven mica and three women to the point of death and British intransigence is now leading towards a new hiunever strike.

Dununy this strugele the British have been ertticised both in freland, in Britain and mternationally. Even their fellow imperialists tn the European Court -a court that deseribed British torture after internment as iUb-treatment’ - while refusing Lo support the posoners, condemned British intransigence. “To all these criticisms the British reply is the same - that the conditions in the Prisons are sell inflicted and that the prisoners are themselves responsible for Che oppression they are suffering under. This nonsensical argument is the sort of argument that repressive rezimes everywhere use against ther own prisoners, OF course if the prisoners were to bend the knee to their captors their conditions would improve. Thats is precisely the issue, The prisoners will nol bend the knee and we should fight this attempt to break and huiniliate them

PRISONERS OF PARTITION

The British have not put in five years of effort simply to win an isolated victory over the prisoners. They plan to deny not just the prisoners legitimacy as political prisoners but also Che legitimacy of the whole movement against partition and aainst their presenee in Ireland. Such a victory would give a new lease of life to the whole Page 3

apparatus of repression; torture: the no-jury Diplock courts, ‘Internment by remand? and finally the grinding oppression of a prison system determined to break and deprade the prisoners.

S49 The result in the North would not be 7the rule of law? but a savagely t discriminatory system of two laws, with state forces, pidiciary and prison system all pouting unswervingly af the anti-unionist populat * ion and all involved to some extent in collusion with Loyalist killers, Recent events bear this out. The UD LA. remains legal and a cloak of silence is Uhrawn over their assassinations of H-Block/Armagh activists. Contucts in the British Army. RULC. and UD OR. continue to pass on intelligence to the kilfer squads. “The British turn a blind eye us Paisley openly advocates an armed coup.

The eflects would not be confined to the North. Phe £100 oullion that Hlaughey has already spent on border securily to maintain partion would be followed by more and more open collaboration aus more of the secret clauses of the Dublin sumiunt come into etfect Fhe present relatively miner harassment of He Block militants would be followed by preater repression as Haughey tries fo ensure that the mass anti-imiperialist sentiment that overthrew the coalition does not return to sweep bim away also. ‘Phe British and their Irish supporters have for over len years tried to confine the mass unrest bred from fifty years of partition. Now the economic base of puperialist rule ism decay ase. UH they manage to defeat the anti- Imperialist nulitants now then there ts a titch greater possibility of their being able to defeat the whole working chaiss in the struggles to

COME.

[he prisoners are therefore “Prisoners of Partition” in several distioct senses. They are ain jatl becatse of the mass political convulsion that has challenged imperialist rule tn freland over the past twelve years.

They are mn jail because of the special political laws and the political mechamisis of torture, repression and gadicial internment that are necessary fo keep paruilion alive. Uinally their treatment in prison is partof an attempt to legitimate partition and secure British cule over yet another veneration of the Trish people.

However tf Che consequences of the deteat ate srave then the opport unities offered by a victory for the prisoners are correspondingdy Page 4

great. A new mass movencut woukl have been established. It would be untted and filled with confidence and be ina position to move vpainst OUler aspects of British oppression and Pree State coHaboration. The British would have seen the ruin of their imain plans. The stabilisation of partition and of the whole repressive apparatus on which itis based would bave been driven back and the question of British withdrawal would become a real possibility.

Above all there would be the possibility of a unity of all Che political, economic and social struggles of the working class and the forging of a mass revolutionary force Ghat will finally destroy miperialist and capilahst rule in treland.

IMPERIALIST STRATEGY

If we are to successfully push Britain back in this central struggle we need lo have some appreciation of Ueir overall aims. ‘The worldwide rationalisation of capital in the 1960s had its effects in both Irish states. [t led to the destabilisation of British and Unionist rule in the North and helped bring to a focus mass discontent with the unjust and sectarian Stormont regime. Since then Britain has fought to re-stabilise partitron and to dcteat the broad anti Imperkulist current Ghat has developed.

The mass pressure of the Civil Rights movement was able to force (he abolition of a whole series of repressive taws including. the hated Special Powers Act. But the movement did not aim to abolish partition and lor its whole history the partitioned state bas needed a whole apparatus of repression to survive. A whole series of Public Order and ‘Emergency Power were drafted to (ill the gap.

These were not sufficient to halt the rowing mass movement, which was taking on an mercasing direct anti-imperialist character alter the seclirian pogroms of 1969 and the direct military nivolvement of Page 5

the British Army. The British introduced internment in 197 basa hamimnerblow that would smask this movement once and for all.

They were unsuccessful. The mass movement responded with a new unify under Che Northern Resistance Movement, the Rent and Rates x strike and the No-Go areas. A wider and more organised support bepan to appear in the 26 counties and international solidarity with the resistance grew Co new levels. ta January $972 Britain’s last card - the organised murder of Bloody Sunday - tailed and Stormont fell.

ard It was at Ghis point that the resistanee fallercd. Tt was too vavue and heteropencous a movement to move on to force a British withdrawal Without a clear programme it bepan to falter and disintegrate. The British were able to use this confuston to retain infernment and the Political Hostages Refease Committee, which replaced the N-R-M_, was unable to force us withdtawal The British were Cherefore able to phase out internment, which was an embarrassment to (hem, in their own time and carefully build an alternative.

The main elements of (his alternative were enshrined in the Diplock report. Lord Diplock argued that intimidation of witnesses and jurors made changes mt the liw necessary. Wisely fe didn’t give examples becanse instances of intimidation of witnesses are extremely rare und those of intimidation of jurors almost non-existent. Ele was using (be same justification for the suspension of normal judicial procedure as is used by repressive regimes allover the world. In each case the real reason is that the unjust society that the law protects is lacing a popular upstuige of discontent and can no lonper Operate wilh even the appearance of co-operation trom those it Oppresses.

Diplock recommended oneyudge juryless Courts and changes in the rules governing evidence so that voluntary’ statements to the police could serve as the olay basis fora conviction This amounted to a torturers charter and Diplock made this clear when he reconunended that the Police be empowered to hold suspects for 3 days without charge, giving them the time they needed to obtain ‘voluntary’ confessions. The Diplock | aws were codified wy the 1973 Notthern Ereland (emergency Provesions) Act and in the [O74 Prevention of Terrorisin Act extended the period of detention withoul charee to 7 Page 6

diys. Vhe British ftaally teleased the last intermees in December 1975.

The Diplock system was well established. Tortute bad become a central part of the judicial system. Tts vietinms could be beld for ap to lwo years On ‘interiauent by round? and up to 90% of those who came to trial could be convicted solely on the ‘evidence’ of voluntary contession. “The British now had a system abnost as eflective us internment aud requiring ne more than tl did tn the way of evidence which yet bad a judicial cover that enabled them to win open support for the repression from the pro-imperialist elements within the Catholic community. The next step needed to establish this system beyond question was the use of force against the Prisoners to deny their political status. (@

POLUTICAL AIMS

However Britain’s strategy can not be redticed simply to one of repression, although repression and the atempt to crush the anti IMperialist movement has always been at the centre of al its initiatives Their constant aint bas been to restabilise partition, Their virst atiempt came wilh an cftort to give Stormont a facelift. fr 1971 Faulkner offered the SLE PS places on Stormont committees. They eagerly accepted, but the prowine mass revolt swept first this scheme, them Stormont itself, into the dustbin of history, Phe ‘powersharing? executive pave an opportunity te view British plans in practice. “The S.D ALP. had power. but that power existed only to defend partition and to crush the resistance - to oversee internment, tosmash the Rent and Rates strikers and operate Che infamous ‘Payment for Debt Act agaist le poorest and most oppressed sections of the community. “Chis is what imperialism required trom the bourgors Nationalists. Prom the Unionists it required only a formal acknowledgement that Cathloies had a role in the partitioned state. “They were notable to give that assurance. A Loyalist uprising brought down the Exccutive and the British gave way.

Phe 1974 revolt showed that the | oyalists lanka veto and that the Page 7

British were not willing to pive up the mass pro-imperialist base that they represented. A further revalt by Paisley in 1977 tailed to win the Loyalists own programme of a return to Stormont. Phe British were the masters and though they would do much to conciliate the Loyalists yet still they would delermine strategy.

In the period since then the fragmentation on Unionism has inereased and the largest section has drifted further to the right and consolidated around Paisley. It has become increasingly unlikely that they can make any accomodation to Cathloics. The glaring fact is that the six-county staie can not be reformed.

But the British are determined that it will be preserved. Undeterred by thetr inability to reform the Unionists they are turning fo the rest of the Irish Capitalist class to underwrile their guarantee to the Unionists. The capitalists of Fianna Fail, the $.D.L.P. and the other major parties ure only too eager lo apree but the mass antiimperialist sentiment that still exists represents a preat danger to them. They need room to manocvure, and the British can provide that by smashing the anti-imperialist movement. ‘This explains the political component of the British offensive on the prisoners and why they are not interested in compromise but only in victory. Tt also explains why Gerry Filt, Paddy Devlin, Garret Fitzgerald and Bishop Daly have joined in the offensive apainst the Prisoners and why Hume, Haughey and O’Faich pave all their cnergies to a pretence at negociation while holding the masses firmly back from involvement in the campaign on the streets. It atso highlightd t he fact that if the H-Block/Armagh campaign is to win the mass support necessary for viclory then it must take on and expose these proimperialist gangsters.

THE RESISTANCE

1972 marked the high point of the present struggle. A united and confident mass movement brought down Stormont and forced the British to concede political status. These victorics were followed by long years of downturn and by a period of reaction during which we were forced onto the defensive and the imperialists went on the offensive. Even today, when we have reprouped and achieved a fair measure of unity, we remain on the defensive and Page8

Aa we are fighting desperately to preserve political status and save the lives of the prisoners. What went wrong? Why were we not able to push on to victory aud thus avoid the Jong years of violent stalement since (hen? The level of represession does not explain the decline. Uhe movement was able lo grow and move forward even under the lannetrblows of internment and Bloody Sunday. Vhe tall force of Loyalist terror was felt alter the dechne of the mass movement, net belore. We believe that the cuuse was rather the internal contradictions and political confusion within the movement. It had achieved sufficient clarity and unity in its demands and methods to bring down Stormont but not sufficient to force out the British and achieve a united Treland. Any iuss Imevement that hopes to finally defeat imperialism will have to be 32-county in scope, be based on the organised political and cconomic power of the working class and be engaged in ongoing strugeles against the political, social and economic consequences of Imperialist domination. [nm 1972 the Northern Resistance movement was based in Lhe six counties. had no clear class base and was active only in relation to the direct political results of imperialist oppression.

In fact many of it’s militants saw unionism as the main enemy and saw no need to continue a struggle against the British. The decay of the N.R.M. was hastened by a fundamental error by the Provisionals.

Following informal contacts through the SDAP. they held sceret nepociations with the British and called a ceasefire. Phe problem here wasn’t the ceasefire but the negociations. All Che parties in the N.R.M. were pledged to ‘No talks until internment ends’ and the N-R.M. was able to prevent the S-DUEP. having any open contact with the British. By breaking this pledge the Proves confused and demoruised militants and let the S.D EP. off the leash.

We are not raising this matter now as some obscure piece of political sectarianism. ‘The fact is that to day we have a movement that is based on all 32 counties. To-day we lave a movement that las, at least in embryo, a presence within the working class and in otlter social layers. To-day we are trying to muzzle the S.DLLP. and other capitalist parties and prevent Chem from sclling us to the British.

‘Yo-day also in the campaien there isa debate about methods and Page 9

aims, stratepy and tactics, that mirrors questions that arose a decade ago. We should learn as much as we can trom this history of our strupple rather than repeat the mistakes of the past.

MASS ACTION AND MILITLARISM

‘This most straight@orward expression of this discussion has been the ‘mass acuon and militarism’ debate between Peoples Democracy and sections of the Provisional Republican movement, part of a more general discussion within the Republican movement and the whole spectrum of the anthimperialist( movement.

Militarism is the belief that military action represents a qudb itative step beyond mass action and that armed froups can substitute for the masses and themselves carry out the revolution. We in Peoples Democracy hold to the marxist belief that the actions of the masses and the organisation of the working class represent the key to revolutionary victory. The Irish prople have of course the right to use force against Imtperitlism, the catise of all the bloodshed and violence, but the correct application of that force ts in the defence of the mass movement rather than in the operation of a separate military CaM papa A militarist conception of the role of the mass movement lay at the root of the Republicans error in 972. They thought that mass activity could be toned down during negociations with the British and then stepped up again. ‘The fact is that mass action is independent of the political parties involved in mass caMpaiyns.

They can impede its development but building and extending it is much harder. Its true Ghat the decline in the mass movement was largely duc to objective factors. However that decline led to 2 vicious spiral.

[tled toa further concentration by the Republicans on a military Page 10

aan ee campaign, a decrease in the importance they attached to polittcal activity and thus a reduction in anti-imperiahst unity and a further decline in the mass movernent. A brief revival in united aclivtty in the Political Hostages Release Committee ended with the Provo’s withdrawal and the tong decline continued until 1976,

THE RELATIVES ACTION COMMITTEES

1976 marked both the lowest point in the struggle and the beetmnings of the regroupment. The removal of political status in March marked the highly defensive nature of the campaign and the formation of the pro-imperialist ‘Peace People’ underlined the weariness OF the masses and the gull separating them from the anti-tm hnperialist Movement. With the withdrawal of status Peoples Democracy began to arvue for anew anthimperialist allance in support of the prisoners and political status. Initially we were unsuccessful and had to go ahead on our own wilh i poster and petition campaign. Slowly Relatives and supporters of the prisoners began to organise and the prisoners themselves bepan their resistance with Kieran Nugent’s decision to £0 ‘on the blanket? rather than be hurmihated and criminalised by the prison tepime. “This new organised resistanee became codified in the formation of the Relatives Action Committees and the bringing together of relatives, political parties and individual mulitamts in one united fromt structure, Through the R-A.C.s sipathicant gatas were made. Tt provided a new unity, regrouped the anthimperialist torces and carrted out the slow patient work of extending popular awareness of the P- Block camp aign and developing a general ant-inperialist sentiment mn the mass of the Irtsh people. Slowly the tide began to tum. The RACs were able to expose the pro-imperilist nature of the “Peace People? and their willingness to st support British violence and that movement began a gradual distr epration. In 1977 the Coalition was thrown eut of office ina wave of revulsion against their blatant colkiboration. Unlortunately the Page Il

Tweedledum of the Coalition was replaced by the Tweedledee of Tianna Pail, but there was an evident prowth of the anti-inmiperiatlist sentiment on which amass movement would base ifsell, Unfortunately the movement was not ina position to fully uuilise the opportunities that existed. Tt remained largely a Northern move ment and only afew oulitants accepled the Peeples Democracy analysis of this struggle as a central question that would involve a long und extended campaign to build a mass movernent. “Phe years of isolation and reaction had produced in many Republican militants a narrow ultraleftism and political sectarianism that made them distrustlul of new forces entering the campainn, Phese tendencies pained in strength as it became clear Ghat no immediate victory was in sight und as the pressure of work and the immediacy of the prisoners suffering, weighed down on militants. “Vhis was especially the cuse in Sinn Fein, which remained ambiguous about the value of united work The two tendencies came toa head at the Coalisland conference in January 1978. Bernadette McAliskey, many independents and the left had built the conference as a way of broadening the campaign, At the conference Sinn Fein called for support for the armed campapn asa precondition for ant eimperialist unity. The result was a erudual narrowing of the campaign. Rather than looking outwards to the masses and drawing new militants into activity the RACs were placing conditions that acted as a barrier fo those militants. A broad plan of campaign was replaced by small-scale tactical activities - roadblocking and occupations. An iHepalist conception of organisation Jed to disorganised confrontations, noting. and arrests and injuries hardly an incentive to the anconmetted to join the campaign.

Even more serious was the pradual exclusion of the political parties.

At its formation the RAC had given folbspeaking rights at rallies and full delegate status to them. Gradually speaking rights were with drawn - a process helped on by the Trish Workers Group, who ieresponsibly demanded full riphts without being active in the campata. After along politival strugede dclegate rigdads were also with drawn and Peoples Democracy and the other political parties lost any formal position in the campaien. The militants accepted the argue.

meat that the RACS were ‘non political’, but the result of the decision was to reduce the political independence of the movement.

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Historically all united activity has depended on the active co-operation of the Republicans. This was obscured by the denial of political rights to the parties and the RACs were seen as subordinate to the Republican movement even to the extent that Sinn Fein were able to cancel RAC demonstrations in favour of their own rallies. All this was a natural outyrowth of the militarist conciousness of many militants and a view of the work of the RAC as subordinate to campaigns agaiust prison warders and other miltlury actions.

The debate continued both inside and outside the RACs. In January 1979 Peoples Democracy organised a broad and open Commemoration Committee to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Burntolfet march and this mobilised all sections of the anti- Imperialist movement except Sinn Fein. During the British General election in the North we organised a “Vote EP campaign as an alternative to the sterile policy of a boycott. Without doubt however the Breatesl gain tor the politics of mass action came from Bernadette McAliskey’s participation in the European Plections. ‘the massive 36,000 votes cast for her showed the size of the anti-imperialist vanguard even when divided by Sinn Pein’s decision to boycott - the much larger vole for Hume the distance we had to travel to build a THE Hf BLOCK/ARMAGH CAMPAIGN

AND THE HUNGER STRIKL

The reader, while accepting the historical accuracy of the last few pages, may feel that P.D. is itself politically sectarian ta take up the past, especially during a hunger strike. We would reply firstly, that there is all the difference in the world between a sectarian attack and constructive fraternal crilicism and secondly, that the formation of the Smash H.Block/Armagh campaign advanced the debate but did not resolve it and that that debate contained questions absolutely crucial to victory.

The formation of the campaign represented a significant shift for Sinn Pein and a marked advance for the anti-iiperialist movement. [t ave a simple and straight forward grounds for unity around the five demands. It brought Page 13

topether all the anG-imperialist militants urone movement and built massive mobilisations. Most importantly of all iCestablished for the tirst time in the strupyle a truly national campaign in all 32 counties. By the onset of the hunper strike it had established bases in dhe ‘lrades Union movernent, the Wornens movement, Student and Youth proups aed in sporting and cultural Urganisutons. There were however problems. Many nilitants beliewed that the mass mobilizations were a miuass movement. Others believed that the hunger strike would itself muaiantee mass action and victory. More dangerous was Uic behef that wera a hunger striker died there would he a tiass uprising, woorbe the fact (hata movement unable to prevent stich a deat would be unable to ensure vielory afterwards. Vhe lack of delepate structures tended to isclate cach section of the campaipn and slowed down debate. To build elfeetive nies action the Guupaign had to challenge the bourycois nationalist parhes but right up te the end of the campaign it remained confused in its attitude towards thei The outcome of the hunger stake proved the ctlectiveriess of muss action.

For the first thine in the whole history of the political stitus campain indeed for the fist Gime since the fall of Stormont - the British were forced to offer concessions. However, the movement was nol stronp enouph to force the prancing of the five demands or even to force the iuphemeatation of the concessions and as a resull itis now facing a sertous setback and lets entered ae new hunger stike campapo with the immediate Cask of cleaning up the confusion and demoralisation caused by Chat xethack. What are the lessans of the hunger strike?

One lesson of the campaign ts the tinuts of the eflorts of the prisoners (hem.

of the campaiwn, but at the end of the day itis those outside the prison whe have the power to wina victory. The hitnger stake put ai immense pressure on those active in the campaign. te belped cul away some of the old deadwood of political sectarianism and allowed the political sroups Co co-operate more freely and to integrate the structures of the Northern Rekitives Action Commun lees Into a national sCructure. Hoalsa brought toa fine focus the general public sympathy for the prisoners. What it could not do is slatke the betiel of the mass of the mass of the Wish people in thetr traditional leadership oc provide astrategy for militants to achieve this.

At the founding conference of the rational campaign, People’s Democtacy put forward what we believe is suc a strategy. A ceatial potrt was a continuing pressure on Eisoina Pailband the S DLL to expose (heir inaction and betrayal of the prisoners. At the bepinning of Che lumper strike we proposed Page 14

the slogan (Ne fatks with British Torturers’ | Many of our ideas were accepted as immediate taches bit they were never developed as a lonp term strategy.

We were represented at every level in the campaign but foand Urat the fack of formal delegate structures intibited the political debate that would have claried this. The clearest example of (his ts the series of attacks Uhal Gerry Pitt launched on the prisoners. Pater, Michael Allison, British Mituster in charpe of the Norths prisons, cited this as Che trast important element im their resistance to political status. Igave comrape toa thousand Gerry Fitts in Fianna bar and the SDPO and enabled Waughey and (ume to provide a cover tor British intransipence by a contiquing facade of negotiation.

Yel the EFBlock/Armagh campaign hupely ipnored Pitts attacks and when PD. launched a ‘2renp fic petition in Belfast it was supported by only individual militants and was labelled a ‘dimersion by Sinn Fein. Now the task of unseating Gerry Fitt has become more urgent than ever.

The sume weaknesses apply to other areas of the campaign. The trade union day of aetion showed thata substantial minority of workers were willing, to take industrial action even in the face of intimidation by manapement and domination by union leaders. Yet the work of building in this central area was left (oy the fade unton subcommittees and the tasks of organising and lobbying workpkices was not taken up by the general campaign. “Phe crucial Gisks of organising a specifically working class clement of the campaign and challenping the pro-mperialist union leadership were pot achieved.

In (he other areas of struggle. students and youth, women, the cultural movement and orparnising international sapport the same pattern developed.

New inovemernts and new areas of slrupple developed. Militants who became Invelved showed great activity und enthusiasm. But the central overall stratery for an all-out victory was not developed nor, as a result, were all these areas welded together mto one campara, In the Fast days of the hunger strike one central question came to dominate the campaign - the question of force, [ft became evident to many anti-iniperitlists during the course of the campaign that ne military solution to the question of political status existed. Military actions that were undertaken either did not affeet the overall developorent of the campainn or, in some cases, actually damaged it, Vhis in itsel! will generate considerable debate in the anti-cinperialtst movement. But if does pot mean chat) British Imperialisos can he swayed from its path by peaceful persuasion, ; Wein PLD. see the answer in brolding amory, the mass of the people in the Page I5

6 counties a willingness to cntpage in their own delence against imperialist attacks. It is not enough Co bring militants onte the streets or fo win iss sympathy. ‘The sympathy and support must be hardened out, by a vehement defence of what rights already exist and by publicly establishing the culpability of the British in the assassination campaign avains! PeBlock/ Armagh nulitants.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE ?

The chicl need now is thal we remobilise and learn the lessons of the hunger strike in formulating anew policy, ‘The full attendance at the Fanuary conference shows (hal we can remobilise and the main resoluGian shows that at least the outlines of a stratepy are available. We have made a start but now serious discussion is needed at all levels to change rather vague and rhetorical aims into a campaipn of action. We need to defend ourselves and we need to prove the method of mass action as the crucial weapon for the prisoners and for the anti-imperialist cause.

The January Conference of the HE Block/ Armagh canpaipn adopted a whole series of strategic aims . These include Hf Demands on the Fianna bail government and on nationalist eroups, North and South, to withdraw from all talks with the British.

2) An end to all cross-border collaboration.

3} Calls on the Nationalist parties, churches and trade unions to condenm the assassination of TEBlock/ Armagh militants and defend the rieht af the campaign te carry on political activity.

4f A threat to destabilise the 6 counties if the British do tet give way famended by the LR.S.P to inehude destabilisation of the 26 counties).

SP Calls for the building of the campaien in trade uniens, umonest vouth and in the womens movement Does this provide away forward for the Ginipaine’? We believe tliat the general linc, which reflects elements of PLD. proposals during the hunper strike does do this. Llowever, there are serious weaknesses. Uhe reselugion has ultralef elements -- section 4 / a threat to destabilise the 32 counties) Page 16

isutlerty beyond the capacities of Che campayni aod would require is Cransformation into a tevolutionary party, rather than a united movement for the defence of the prisoners. The resolution does not detail the methods of building the campaipn in each ares.

At the beginning of the hunger strike, we argued thal the campaign, in order lo puatantee success, would have to face the British with something worse than granting Ue demands of the prisoners by bepinning to build a mass movement of the majority of the Irish people. At the end of the hunper strike we cansay that the niin block to extending that movement was the fish capitalist class - ba tl and bitzgerald with their direet attacks and dure and Haughey with their manoeuvres.

Ant-imperalists need to understand the nature of the bourgeots mationstist parties. They are pro-imperialist | They want to see the stabilising of impenahst mile and the defeat of all the anti-imperialist forees. Any apparent contradiction of this in their words or actions arises from ther need to appease the massively anti-imperialist sentiment of the mass of the people. We can use this comtudiction as a lever lo bring the masses mite action and thus turee bath the British and their local supporters fo retreat. Vhis needs a tine sense of batanee. Wwe ignore hem Uiey retain popular support and we remain iclatively isolated. Howe simply appeal to them we will simply reintorce popular illusions. Immediately this involves slow and patient work in the constituencies, (inst to determine the attitude of councilors and T.D2s and then to use that intoration to biuld support in the areas. The campaign faces the challenge of the local elections in the North. A whole tanpe of possibilities are open to the movement to challeme the prisoners oppancats bul itis clear thal we mast use this opportunity, not ignore it. or sadulec in the sterile polities of a boycott.

The greatest foree available to the camapipn is that of the orpanised working class. Durinp the last hunper stake a substantial misnovity of workers were willing, to oranise industrial action even in the face of (hreats tron: coiployers and union leaders. We must build on this, but we must face the fact that The leadership of the unions is pro imperiitist and there ts an organised anti iMopecialist curcent. This means that the whole HE Block/ Armagh campain must involve itself in Chal work and net leave if to small sub-committees.

It also means that we must pot settle for the support of those already willing to be active. By constant pressure on the anton leadership we will increase the strength of the movement. What is needed ts not slopans ubout ‘General Sirtke’ but a serious assessment of our terces and the pateot work of growth and expansion, and the organisation al specific layers of workers bucked by the support of the whole CUUP AEN, Page |7

A similar situation exists amo: students and youth and im the womens mavement. fi the students movement the spur ot the hunger strike campaign has brought forwad the possibility of a broad movement of socialist students

HCTIVE ON W WHOTG SC TLGS OF ISSTEGS.

In the womens movement a sharp division has occurred over the issue of the prisoners and a significant layer fas mobilised around the prisoners. However, a struggle has lo be waged lo move outwards to reach the mass of trish women and convince them of their place in (his carupaigt and its links with their own day to day strupple. This work requires net justsupport for the five demands but a clear understanding ola detailed programme of mass struggle which has to be apphed against avconstantly shitting political background. “Phe movement that can apply this needs the most thoroughgaing political debate and democracy - not just among the action committees but also amor the speciuh areas of work and amonp the political parties. Before we go out Go couvinee the mass of the Lrish people we should convince ourselves that we have a clear united strategy of lass aclion.

CONCTUSION

In this pamphlet we lave shown that Bntain is to blame for the situation in the HW Blocks and Armaph and in fact that (he situation there is the resull of a deliberate offensive by them. We have shown that this offensive has consequences both for the peneral campaizn of repression apainst anti-imperialists and for the whole British cunpain to lesitimusc partition, and re-slabilise it. This means that a united anti mapertilist movement has to devote all its tesourees to building, tas action if itis to succeed, buat il also means that a victory would nol simply be a disappointment fo (he British but asavape setback, and the ant-imperialist movement would have wor their lirst victory trom 1972, To provide a basis for strategy we have examined the history of the anti-iimperialist movement and the political statits strupele. ‘This has not been a history of un-anterrupted advance and many important questions rentiain unresolved.

One thing as clear however. All the conditions fora virelory are preseat and in fact there is a greater resentment amainst (he British than has existed for many yeas. We have a aational movement forthe fist time and one that reaches all sectors of trish society. Our main task is to dnite anionp otrselves and agree ona cotumon steulepy.

The major block on the movement is (he titervention of the trish capitatist Page 18

class Lo use ther iifucnee with the masses to block a vietory for the prisoners. But if that increases the difficulties and dangers if also means the Increased risks for them and a massive blow to their prestige and credibility if we succeed. Ie we are challenging pro-tmperialist leaderships in all areas of Irish society, that means that we are developing the beginnings of an antiimperialist Jeadership in all these areas. This is happening in a number of wavs. The campaign is bringing together a whole layer of militants in each area ol struggle. In trying to raise the issue of the prisoners they are learning the methods of political operation and inevitably they discuss among thernselves ether aspects of imperialist oppression. The British are trying to physically crush the anti-imperialist movement and work out anew stability for partition before they have to face inevitable explosions by the workine class against the recession and imperialist economic explotlauion. WW we successfully defend ourselves and the prisoners we could lay the groundwork for a historic defeat of lnpertalism in the next period.

The history of the past decade shows the jimpurtance of the mass action of the lish people in challenging Imperialism. ‘he history of political status stragele and of the last hunper stiike underline this.

This booklet is an attempt to sum up the lessons of strupele thal will both encourage sympathisers lo involve themselves in the campaign and slow ways in which those inside the campaign ean strenpthen and extend the strupple.

But the booklet also provides an ample justification for Peoples Democracy.

Using the marxist method of class analysis we bave played a major role in the whole history of the struggle. We were the fitst to see the political status struggle as a central Cask and we were the first to codify the tasks of the H Block/Armagh campaign and thus foresee the problems that would arise ond the necessity of challenging the major pro-imperialist parties.

you want to po on from this struggle to help develop a revolutionary intermationalist movement of the workinp class we call on you to join Peoples Democtacy and play youn part in constricting it.

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Further Reading Phere is how a prowing range of fiterature on the political prisoners in the Hl-Blocks, Long Kesh and Armagh Women's Jail.

One of he best is the reporlot Memen Against fimperialism (WAL) on Armagh Jail. Another excellent description of the issucs at stake can be found in Frade Unions and Hf Block produced by the trade union sub-committee of the National H Block Committee.

On The Blanket by the editor of THe Irish Press a bivanna Fail leaning daily Southern Irish newspaper - Tim Pat Coogan, is Fairly sympathetic to the prisoners. Fe contains much useful information.

However the political views of the author are pro Cardinal O° Fiatch and fianna Fail, so that he docs nat unequivocally support the puisoncrs’s demands and cally tor ‘tnegotiations’’. [tis published by The Ward River Press in Dublind and costs £2.50.

Beating the Terrorists? by Peter Taylor, a British TV reporter who has tried to iiftthe veil on the dirty work of (he RUC tortures, pives an excellent description of how the British government implemented its “crommalisation’ policy. 101s published by Penguin, and costs £1.50.

For more veneral reading we would recommend Northern freland the Orange State written by a ftounder-member of People’s Democracy, Michael Farrell. Vhis ts a full and detatled history of the Six Counties fren ts bloody oaripins in the 1920s to the upheavals of the diate 19608 and 1970s. This is published by Pluto Press and casts £5.98. bora general history of Ircland , you should read The Republic of freland, writhen by another PO member, DR. O'Cannor Lysaght, published by Mercier Press.

Other PD pamphlets: Socialism Made fasy. James Connolly. (with an intraducnion by DER.

O'Connor Lysaght). Cast Psp.

The Limerick Soviet, DR. O'Connor Lysaght. Cost 40p fL-Block fresh Revolution an the March Cost 1Sp Nuclear Danger Cost SOp. What is Tropdésism? By Ernest Mandel. Cost 20p.

A People Undefeated, by John MacAnully. Cost SOp, Make the Rich Pav — Rehind the PAYEE Revolt. cost Sp frist Nationalism ane British Tnperiatism, By Robert Dorn, Cost 25p.

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PEOPLES DEMOCRACY NATIONAL APPEAL

H- BLOCKIARMAGH

Besides the production of this pamphlet we plan : * General campaign leaflets * Work in building international involvement * Leaflets directed at different sectors of the campaign We also intend to’stand P.D. candidates in the local government elections and plan to build a general electoral alliance of all those candidates supporting the prisoners.

For this work we need at least : £700 Help build a socialist voice in the H-Block/Armagh campaign. Send donations to : * John North Connolly Bookshop, Avoca Park, Andersonstown, Belfast II

FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT PEOPLES DEMOCRACY

WRITE TO US AT

Dublin address 38 Clanawley Road, Killester, DUBLIN 5 Belfast Address : Connolly Bookshop, Avoca Park, Andersonstown, BELFAST II

oupport Hunger Strikers Published by Peoples Democracy.